State Implementation of National Health Reform: Harnessing Federal Resources to Meet State Policy Goals by Stan Dorn
1State Implementation of National 
Health Reform: Harnessing  
Federal Resources to Meet State 
Policy Goals
by Stan Dorn
Prepared for State Coverage Initiatives by the Urban Institute
July 2010 (Updated on September 3, 2010)
2Table of Contents
Executive Summary .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 3
Overview of Report   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5
Key Features of National Health Reform  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 6
Maximizing Residents’ Health Coverage and Access to Care  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11
Fundamental Questions about Health Insurance Exchanges  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 17
Restructuring Health Insurance to Function More Like a Traditional Market  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 18
Holding Insurers Accountable to Consumers  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 25
Reforming Health Care Delivery and Financing to Slow Cost Growth and Improve Quality  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 30
Reducing State Budget Deficits  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 38
Conclusion  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 42
Notes  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 42
About the Author
Stan Dorn, J .D ., is a senior fellow at the 
Urban Institute’s Health Policy Center . He 
has worked on health care issues for more 
than 25 years at the state and federal levels . 
Mr . Dorn is a leading national expert on 
programs and issues affecting low-income 
people and other vulnerable populations, 
including the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Medicaid, the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP), and subsidies for uninsured, laid-
off workers . Before the Urban Institute, 
Mr . Dorn served as a senior policy analyst 
at the Economic and Social Research 
Institute; Health Division director for the 
Children’s Defense Fund; and managing 
attorney at the National Health Law 
Program’s Washington office . 
Acknowledgements
The author thanks his Urban Institute 
colleagues who provided assistance 
and advice, including Linda Blumberg, 
Kelly Devers, John Holahan, Ariel Klein, 
Juliana Macri, Brenda Spillman, and 
Timothy Waidmann . The author is also 
grateful for the good counsel of the State 
Coverage Initiatives program staff as well 
as Joel Ario, the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Commissioner; Alice Burton, consultant 
for the Maryland Governor’s Health Care 
Reform Coordinating Council; Allen 
Feezor of North Carolina’s Department 
of Health and Human Services; Eugene 
Gessow, the Director of the Arkansas 
Division of Medical Services within the 
Department of Human Services; Jeanene 
Smith, Administrator of the Office for 
Oregon Health Policy and Research; Jackie 
Scott of the National Academy for State 
Health Policy; and Stephen A . Somers 
of the Center for Health Care Strategies . 
Neither these individuals, the Urban 
Institute, AcademyHealth, nor the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation are responsible 
for the opinions expressed in this report, 
which are the author’s sole responsibility .  
About SCI
The State Coverage Initiatives (SCI) 
program provides timely, experience-
based information and assistance to state 
leaders in order to help them move health 
care reform forward at the state level . SCI 
offers an integrated array of policy and 
technical assistance services and products 
to help state leaders with coverage 
expansion efforts as well as with broader 
health care reform . Our team of policy 
experts tailors its approach to meeting 
state decision makers’ needs within SCI is 
a national program of the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation administered by 
AcademyHealth . For more information 
about SCI, please visit our web site,  
www .statecoverage .org .
About the Urban Institute 
The Urban Institute gathers data, 
conducts research, evaluates programs, 
offers technical assistance, and educates 
Americans on social and economic issues 
— to foster sound public policy and 
effective government .
3The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA) gives states many new 
tools and resources with which to pursue 
longstanding health policy goals . 
State officials seeking to maximize 
coverage and access to care can take 
advantage of PPACA’s new options to 
establish eligibility for Medicaid and 
subsidies in the exchange . These options 
use highly streamlined methods to help the 
uninsured receive coverage while lowering 
state administrative costs . States could 
also implement the Basic Health Program 
option for residents who are ineligible for 
Medicaid (because of income or a recent 
grant of legal immigration status) but 
whose incomes do not exceed 200 percent 
of the federal poverty level (FPL) . Such 
an option could make coverage and care 
much more affordable for low-income 
residents than under the standard subsidy 
system established by PPACA, while the 
federal government would still pay all 
subsidy costs . States could also consider 
supplementing PPACA’s subsidies to 
improve affordability of coverage and care 
to low- and moderate-income residents .
States interested in reforming health 
insurance to function more like a 
traditional market can give consumers 
much improved information about the 
services offered by particular providers 
as well as health coverage options . If 
state officials decide to operate a health 
insurance exchange rather than to leave 
that function to the federal government, 
state policymakers can structure the 
exchange to make a wide range of health 
plan choices available to as many state 
residents and employers as possible . In 
such a system, the consumer, not the 
employer, selects his or her own health 
plan, and those who want more expensive 
coverage must pay the resulting increase 
in premiums . Private health plans will 
thus have an incentive to offer consumers 
the services they want at a price they can 
afford . Insurers’ desire for market share 
will drive innovation that meets customers’ 
needs, as occurs in smoothly functioning 
markets . 
State officials who want to hold insurers 
accountable for providing consumers 
with high-quality, affordable health 
coverage could:
• Dramatically increase their capacity to 
detect insurance company misbehavior by  
 
carefully analyzing the new data that PPACA 
requires insurers to provide; 
•	Permit only insurers that comply with 
reasonable state requirements related to 
cost and consumer protection to offer 
plans in the exchange; 
•	Educate the public and health plans 
about insurers’ potential liability for 
treble damages under the False Claims 
Act, empowering public agencies to 
pursue such claims and to use the 
proceeds to fund further enforcement 
efforts; 
•	Use available federal grants to fund 
independent consumer assistance 
programs to help consumers vindicate 
their individual rights and to bring 
systemic problems to the attention of the 
public and responsible state officials; 
•	Use new federal grants to support rate 
review as well as leverage the exchange to 
supply administrative resources needed 
for enforcement of PPACA’s insurance 
market reforms; and
•	Establish a publicly administered plan 
to compete in the exchange . Such a plan 
would include, as its core membership, 
Medicaid beneficiaries, enrollees in the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP), as well as public employees 
and retirees . This critical mass could 
make it feasible for a state’s providers to 
implement delivery system reforms that 
slow cost growth while improving quality . 
The resulting plan could be offered in 
the exchange, increasing competition for 
private insurers . 
State policymakers interested in 
restructuring health care delivery 
and financing to slow cost growth 
while improving quality have a host of 
opportunities under PPACA . States can:
•	Implement Medicaid demonstration 
projects to test new reimbursement methods 
that reward value, rather than volume;
•	For public employee coverage, use new 
Medicare methods to base payment on 
provider performance; 
•	Incorporate Medicare, Medicaid, and 
private coverage into multi-payor 
initiatives that implement reimbursement 
and delivery system reforms; 
•	Help high-cost, chronically-ill patients 
in Medicaid, public employees, and 
the privately insured participate in the 
“patient-centered medical home” model 
of coordinated care;
Executive Summary
Not all state officials 
share the same health 
policy goals. But 
most state health care 
leaders will find that 
they can use PPACA 
to make significant 
progress toward 
meeting objectives 
they have long viewed 
as important to the 
residents of their state. 
4•	Implement initiatives to prevent costly 
rehospitalization, improving health 
status and saving money for public and 
private payors alike; 
•	Use the results of comparative 
effectiveness research to encourage 
public employees to avoid costly 
procedures and treatments that do 
not contribute to patient health, 
while permitting private employers to 
give their covered employees similar 
incentives; and
•	Apply for federal grants and participate 
in demonstration projects to combat 
obesity, smoking, and other risk factors 
among Medicaid beneficiaries, in low-
income communities, and with other 
residents .
States interested in reducing budget 
deficits could achieve savings on public 
employee health costs by participating 
in federal reinsurance subsidies for early 
retirees . Significant General Fund savings 
could also be achieved, in many states, by 
substituting federal Medicaid dollars for 
current state and local spending on adults’ 
indigent care, mental health services, 
social services, and other state-funded 
programs that, for the first time, will 
potentially fit under Medicaid’s umbrella . 
At the same time, states that now cover 
some adults with incomes above 138 
percent FPL could shift such adults into 
programs where the subsidies are funded 
entirely by the federal government, either 
in the exchange or through the Basic 
Health Program option . Such a shift 
could end the need for states to subsidize 
these adults’ coverage . Finally, Medicaid 
cost growth could be slowed by taking 
advantage of PPACA’s new options to 
fully integrate Medicare and Medicaid 
financing and services for dual eligibles . 
Coordinated care that smoothly integrates 
the two funding streams, eliminating 
current incentives for cost-shifting and 
provider gaming of multiple payors, offers 
the possibility of significant health status 
gains for beneficiaries and cost savings for 
states . 
Not all state officials share the same health 
policy goals . But most state health care 
leaders will find that they can use PPACA 
to make significant progress toward 
meeting objectives they have long viewed 
as important to the residents of their state . 
5The enactment of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) gives 
states new responsibilities and choices for 
reforming health care and health coverage .  
Even at this early date, scores of detailed 
reports have already analyzed many 
aspects of the legislation . Rather than 
itemize everything that PPACA requires 
or permits, this paper seeks to help state 
officials by synthesizing the details of 
federal reform into several broad themes:
•	Maximizing residents’ health coverage 
and access to care;
•	Helping health insurance function more 
like a traditional market;
•	Holding insurers accountable for 
providing high-quality coverage at 
reasonable cost to the consumer; 
•	Reforming the health care delivery 
system to slow cost growth while 
improving quality; and
•	Limiting state general fund spending on 
health care . 
This report excludes a number of 
important topics . For example, it does 
not examine the potential for using 
PPACA to facilitate reform of long-term 
care, which is a critically important issue 
that is a complex world unto itself .1 
Also outside this report are PPACA’s 
workforce investments . This report cannot 
possibly do justice to these issues while 
simultaneously exploring the themes  
listed above .  
This report primarily explores options 
that states can implement by 2014 . Left for 
another day is a detailed examination of 
such issues as the implications for states 
of federal allotments under the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) that 
expire after federal fiscal year (FY) 2015, 
unless Congress reauthorizes CHIP; states’ 
option, beginning in 2017, to give large 
firms access to coverage sold through a 
health insurance exchange; and states’ 
ability, starting in 2017, to obtain  
waivers that allow radically different 
reform approaches than those embodied 
in PPACA .2
Limits on administrative resources will 
make it difficult for many states to go 
beyond the minimum steps needed to 
comply with federal requirements . But in 
states where more than basic compliance 
is possible, this report encourages officials 
to be proactive and selective in identifying 
the additional policy priorities they 
seek to accomplish . A careful focus on 
the “big picture” policy goals that most 
matter to a state can help decision-makers 
sort through the mass of detail in the 
new federal law, focus on the elements 
that offer the greatest promise for 
accomplishing the state’s priorities, and 
chart a course forward that is coherent 
and effective . By showing how particular 
policy approaches would use PPACA to 
achieve specified state goals, this report 
seeks to help state leaders take advantage 
of the new federal law to accomplish 
longstanding policy objectives, which vary 
from state to state .
Overview of Report
6A comprehensive explanation of PPACA 
is beyond the scope of this paper and 
is available elsewhere .3 However, to 
place in context the key choices facing 
states, this section of the paper begins by 
describing the new law’s basic structure . 
It then provides a detailed explanation 
of several parts of the new federal law 
that may be particularly important to 
states—namely, the federal rules governing 
health insurance exchanges; the interaction 
between Medicaid and coverage subsidies 
in the exchange; and a new Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation that 
will be housed at the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) . 
A basic overview
Some provisions go into effect this 
calendar year:
• Medicaid and CHIP
- States may expand Medicaid to cover 
childless adults up to 1384 percent of the 
federal poverty level (FPL),5  with income 
determined based on federal income 
tax rules . Before PPACA, such adults’ 
coverage required federal waivers, which 
were subject to federal budget neutrality 
requirements . Now, an ordinary Medicaid 
State Plan Amendment suffices to make 
these adults eligible . Standard Medicaid 
matching percentages apply before 2014 . 
- As a general rule, states may not cut 
back prior eligibility for Medicaid until 
exchanges become operational in 2014 . 
CHIP eligibility must be maintained 
through 2019 . However, if a state’s federal 
CHIP allotment is exhausted, eligible 
children may be enrolled in subsidized 
coverage offered through the exchange .
- PPACA continues CHIP funding through 
2015 . Beginning with federal fiscal year 
2016, federal matching rates under CHIP 
increase by 23 percentage points, but 
no additional federal CHIP allotments 
are available without further federal 
legislation .
• Other subsidies to facilitate coverage and 
access to care
- Until 2014, $5 billion is available for high-
risk pools that cover previously uninsured 
individuals with preexisting conditions .
- Small firms with 25 or fewer workers 
may qualify for tax credits helping them 
purchase coverage . 
- Community health centers receive an 
additional $11 billion in appropriated 
funding for program operations .
- Federal grants are available for home 
visitation, school-based health centers, 
and other services . 
• Health care delivery system reforms
- To qualify for the above-described, 
federally-funded reinsurance for 
early retirees, an employer plan must 
implement reforms that generate savings 
on care provided to the chronically ill and 
enrollees with high-cost conditions .
- Grants and other new federal initiatives 
encourage a broad range of innovations 
that seek to slow growth in health care 
costs while improving quality . Such 
innovations include patient-centered 
medical homes; reimbursement reforms 
to incentivize safe, effective, high-quality 
care; accountable care organizations; 
better integration of care for individuals 
who receive both Medicaid and Medicare; 
efforts to increase prevention, promote 
wellness, and improve public health; etc .  
• Insurance market reforms
- Insurers may not discriminate against 
children based on preexisting conditions .  
- Lifetime limits and unreasonable6 annual 
limits on coverage are prohibited .
- Health insurance policies cannot be 
cancelled because consumers get sick 
and use care, unless such policies were 
obtained through fraud or deception . 
- Private insurers offering dependent 
coverage must extend such offers to adult 
children through age 26 .
- State offices that provide health consumer 
assistance can qualify for federal grants to 
help individuals and document systemic 
problems . 
- HHS and states will establish and begin 
implementing a process for reviewing 
insurance premiums, identifying 
unreasonable increases, and providing 
public notice about the insurer’s 
justification for such increases .
- Applying a standard format for 
presenting information, HHS establishes 
a web portal that consumers may use to 
compare their health coverage options .  
Between 2011and 2014, other provisions 
become effective. For example:
•	As of January 1, 2011, the percentage of 
premium used to pay for health care—
the so-called “medical loss ratio”—must 
meet or exceed certain thresholds, which 
vary based on the applicable market . 
Plans that violate these requirements 
must refund their excess administrative 
costs to consumers . 
•	For calendar years 2013 and 2014, 
Medicaid reimbursement rates for certain 
primary care services rise to Medicare 
levels, and the federal government pays all 
the resulting cost increase . 
As of January 1, 2014, most of PPACA’s key 
architecture becomes operational:
•	Health insurance exchanges in each state 
offer health plans to small firms and to 
individuals, as explained in much more 
detail below .  
Key Features of National Health Reform
7• Subsidized coverage
-  Medicaid expands to cover all7 children 
and non-elderly adults with incomes 
at or below 138 percent FPL, defined 
in terms of “Modified Adjusted 
Gross Income” (MAGI), an eligibility 
methodology that is based on federal 
income tax law . The federal government 
pays 100 percent of the costs for newly 
eligible adults from 2014 through 2016 . 
After that, the percentage of health care 
costs paid by the federal government 
gradually declines to 90 percent in 2020 
and beyond .  
-  To help consumers afford coverage in the 
exchange, fully refundable tax credits that 
can be advanced directly to insurers when 
premiums are due provide sliding-scale 
premium subsidies to households with 
incomes between 138 and 400 percent 
FPL . Additional subsidies reduce out-of-
pocket costs for households with incomes 
up to 250 percent FPL .  Both premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies are unavailable 
to individuals who qualify for other 
forms of public coverage and to people 
who are offered employer-sponsored 
insurance (ESI) that they can afford 
and that meets minimum standards of 
comprehensiveness . 
• Shared responsibility
- As a general rule, individuals must 
obtain health insurance or pay a tax 
penalty . Exempt from this mandate are 
people with incomes below the tax filing 
threshold, individuals who would be 
required to spend more than 8 percent 
of income for coverage, others for whom 
purchasing coverage would constitute a 
hardship (under rules to be promulgated 
by the U .S . Department of Health and 
Human Services, or HHS), people 
with religiously-based conscientious 
objections to the purchase of health 
insurance, and certain others . 
- A firm with more than 50 full-time 
employees must likewise pay penalties 
if it fails to offer ESI and one or more of 
such employees use tax credits to enroll 
in coverage offered through the exchange . 
• Health insurance markets for individuals 
and for firms with 100 or fewer 
employees are reformed in many ways . 
Although some of these reforms go into 
effect earlier, all of the following are in 
place by 2014:
-  Insurers are forbidden from 
discriminating against adults based 
on gender or health status, including 
preexisting conditions . (As noted above, 
this ban applies to children as of 2010 .) 
Premiums can vary with age, but by no 
more than a 3 to 1 ratio . 
-  Insurers are required to cover federally-
specified minimum benefits, including 
preventive care services (which must be 
exempt from cost-sharing) . 
-  Reinsurance and risk adjustment 
mechanisms provide insurers 
with additional resources if they 
disproportionately attract high-cost 
enrollees . 
A more detailed analysis 
of selected provisions
Three specific issues are so important to 
states that they warrant a more detailed 
analysis . These issues involve health 
insurance exchanges; the interface between 
Medicaid and the exchange in determining 
eligibility for Medicaid, CHIP, and the 
new subsidies created by PPACA; and the 
new Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation that PPACA established within 
CMS . 
 
PPACA’s rules for health 
insurance exchanges
Basic structure
Responsible entity . An exchange can 
be operated by a state agency or a state-
established, non-profit entity . An exchange 
can either carry out its responsibilities 
directly or contract to have one or more 
functions performed by (a) private 
corporations that are not affiliated with 
any health insurers or (b) the state’s 
Medicaid program . Alternatively, the 
federal government can administer the 
exchange (either directly or though 
contract with a non-profit entity) if the 
state requests that it do so8 or if the federal 
government determines that the state 
will be unable to adequately perform the 
necessary functions .  
Geographic scope . Based on the state’s 
choice, a single exchange can operate 
statewide; different “subsidiary exchanges” 
can serve distinct geographic regions 
within the state; or several states can 
jointly operate a multi-state exchange .
Populations served . The exchange serves 
(a) individuals who are U .S . citizens 
or legally resident immigrants and (b) 
employees of small firms and their 
dependents, if such firms choose to use 
the exchange to provide their workers 
with health coverage . Before 2016, states 
decide whether companies using the 
exchange may have a maximum of 50 or 
100 full-time employees . Beginning in 
2016, all firms with 100 or fewer workers 
may use the exchange . Starting in 2017, 
states have the option of opening the 
exchange to larger companies . A state can 
either operate separate exchanges serving 
individuals and firms—the exchange 
serving small employers is called a 
Small Business Health Options Program 
(SHOP)—or a single exchange for both 
individual and small group markets . 
Although PPACA permits states to 
combine their individual and small 
group markets, such a combination is not 
required to run a single exchange serving 
both markets . Rather, a state using a single 
exchange to serve separate group and 
individual markets would offer the same 
plans to all enrollees, individual and group . 
Funding . The federal government 
provides grants to cover start-up and 
other administrative costs through 
the end of 2014 . However, starting on 
January 1, 2015—the second year of 
exchange operation—exchanges must 
raise their own funds . This can be done 
through surcharging insurance premiums; 
assessing health plans, employers, or 
individuals; appropriating state General 
Fund dollars; or otherwise . Whether 
8federal or state in origin, administrative 
funds may not be used for “staff retreats, 
promotional giveaways, excessive executive 
compensation, or promotion of Federal 
or State legislative and regulatory 
modifications .”9 
Health plans
Qualified health plans. An exchange 
may offer only “qualified health plans” 
that it finds satisfy applicable federal 
requirements . Such requirements include 
state licensure, coverage of essential 
benefits, offering packages in the exchange 
with (at a minimum) silver and gold 
actuarial values (explained below), 
premium charges that do not vary based 
on whether coverage is offered inside 
exchanges, nondiscriminatory marketing 
and benefit design, provider participation, 
health care quality, enrollment procedures, 
consumer information, and efforts to 
reduce racial and ethnic disparities . In 
addition to state-specific plans, two 
nationwide plans arranged by the federal 
Office of Personnel Management10 (at least 
one of which must be non-profit) will be 
offered in each state’s exchange .11  
Actuarial value . For both small group 
and individual enrollees, the exchange can 
offer plans at four levels of actuarial value 
(AV) . AV is determined by calculating, for 
an average population, the percentage of 
health care costs that a plan is likely to pay . 
Many different combinations of covered 
benefits and cost-sharing requirements can 
yield the same actuarial value . AV provides 
a single number that indicates a general 
level of comprehensiveness while still 
leaving room for considerable variation in 
the details of coverage . The four AV levels 
in an exchange are as follows:12
•	Platinum, with an AV of 90 percent . 
The typical, employer-sponsored Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO) has 
an AV of 93 percent, according to the 
Congressional Research Service . Such an 
HMO might offer coverage with— 
-  $20 office co-pays; 
-  a $250 co-payment for inpatient 
hospitalization; 
-  no deductible; and 
-  prescription drug co-pays of $10, $25, 
and $45 for generics, preferred, and 
non-preferred name-brand drugs, 
respectively .13  
•	Gold, with an AV of 80 percent . For 
example, a typical employer-sponsored 
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) 
would have an AV between 80 and 84 
percent with:
- an annual deductible of $400 per 
individual and $700 per family; 
- 20 percent co-insurance for in-network 
office visits, inpatient hospitalization, 
lab, and x-ray services (and higher co-
insurance for out-of-network services);
- an overall, out-of-pocket maximum of 
$2,000 per individual and $3,500 per 
family; and 
- prescription drug co-pays of $10, $25, 
and $45 for generics, preferred, and 
non-preferred name brand drugs, 
respectively .14
As another example, a PPO would have an 
80 percent AV with:
-  an annual deductible of $500 per 
individual; 
-  $20 co-pays for in-network office visits;
-  15 percent co-insurance for other in-
network services;
-  an overall, individual out-of-pocket 
maximum of $3,500; 
-  a $75 co-pay for an emergency room 
visit; and 
-  a $10 co-payment for generic medication 
and co-insurance of 25 and 30 percent 
for preferred and non-preferred name-
brand drugs, respectively .15 
•	Silver, with an AV of 70 percent . At this 
level, a plan could have 20 percent co-
insurance, an out-of-pocket maximum 
of $2,975, and an individual deductible 
of $1,900 .16 
•	Bronze, with an AV of 60 percent . One 
example of a plan with AV at this level 
would have 20 percent co-insurance, an 
out-of-pocket maximum of $5,950, and 
an individual deductible of $3,000 .17
For individual enrollees, the exchange may 
also offer catastrophic-only plans to young 
adults under age 30 and to people without 
affordable access to coverage at the bronze 
level or higher . Such catastrophic plans 
cover preventive services (free of cost-
sharing) and at least three primary care 
visits but otherwise allow cost-sharing up 
to the out-of-pocket limit that applies to 
Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) .18  
In the small group market, deductibles in 
2014 may not exceed $2,000 for self-only 
coverage and $4,000 for coverage that 
includes spouses and child dependents . These 
amounts are indexed to rise in later years . 
Is there room in the exchange for high-deductible plans 
that qualify for HSAs?
Some policymakers favor such plans as increasing consumer’s financial incentive 
to avoid unnecessary health care costs and giving consumers more control over 
health care decisions. Fortunately for these policymakers, most HSA-qualified, high-
deductible health plans (HDHP) have sufficient AV to be offered in the exchange. For 
example, the average employer-sponsored, HSA-qualified HDHP has an AV of 76 
percent with a $1,500 annual deductible, 20 percent co-insurance, and a $3,000 
overall out-of-pocket maximum.19 If HHS decides that HSA contributions count in 
determining such a plan’s actuarial value, then adding the typical HSA contribution 
among employers who make such payments raises this high-deductible plan’s AV to 
93 percent.20 Even in the much less generous individual market, the average HSA-
qualified HDHP has an AV of 61 percent, without counting any HSA contributions.21 
Put simply, not all high-deductible plans will qualify for the exchange, but many will.  
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exchange . An exchange may exclude a 
qualified health plan if it finds that doing 
so would be in the best interests of the 
state’s residents or employers who use the 
exchange . In making this determination, 
the exchange can negotiate with insurers, 
take into account premiums, and exclude 
plans that, in the judgment of the exchange 
administrators, charge too much . However, 
an exchange may not impose premium 
price controls or exclude a plan based on its 
use of fee-for-service reimbursement . 
Consumer choice . In the exchange, 
consumers purchasing individual coverage 
may choose any participating plan . 
However, when an employer provides 
group coverage through the exchange, 
the employer selects an actuarial value 
level, and the workers are limited to plans 
at that level . (It is not clear from the 
statutory language whether an employer 
may select more than one AV level at 
which its workers and dependents may 
use the employer’s premium contributions 
to obtain coverage .22)   Consumers may 
change plans during annual open seasons .23 
Consumers pay all of the increased 
premiums when a more expensive plan 
is selected, thus furnishing an incentive 
for cost-conscious choice of coverage . For 
example, premium subsidies are based on 
the second-lowest cost silver plan . When 
subsidy recipients choose a more expensive 
plan, they pay the extra premium cost .   
Administrative functions
Following are the minimum required 
functions of an exchange under PPACA . 
If a state so chooses, an exchange could 
presumably undertake other activities as well .
General administrative functions. An 
exchange must certify, recertify, and 
decertify qualified health plans, operate a 
toll-free hotline, offer an internet website 
with standardized comparative information 
on participating health plans, rate qualified 
health plans in accordance with federal 
standards, present plan options in a standard 
format (including a uniform description of 
coverage consistent with federal standards), 
determine and inform individuals of 
their eligibility for Medicaid and CHIP, 
enroll eligible individuals in Medicaid and 
CHIP, provide an electronic calculator 
that consumers can use to determine plan 
costs (taking into account tax credits and 
cost-sharing subsidies), decide whether 
individuals meet the federal requirements 
for exemption from the individual mandate, 
provide the Treasury Department with 
names and identifying information for 
individuals who are exempt from the 
mandate or whose coverage or employment 
status changes during the year, and inform 
employers when their workers stop receiving 
coverage in the exchange . 
Consumer assistance . In addition to 
the above functions, an exchange must 
operate a Navigator program through 
which private entities provide culturally 
and linguistically appropriate public 
education, facilitate enrollment in qualified 
health plans, and refer consumers with 
complaints or questions to appropriate 
agencies . Navigators must meet federal 
standards for competence, licensure, 
the absence of conflicts of interest, and 
the provision of accurate and impartial 
information . In addition, a state may let 
brokers and agents sell coverage offered in 
the exchange, consistent with standards to 
be promulgated by HHS .   
Accountability
Consultation and stakeholder 
participation . Each exchange is required 
to consult with various stakeholders, 
including enrollees in qualified health 
plans, individuals and entities experienced 
in facilitating enrollment, representatives 
of small business and the self-employed, 
Medicaid offices, and advocates for 
enrolling hard-to-reach populations .24 
Accountability to the federal government . 
Exchanges must keep an accurate 
accounting of all expenditures, submit 
annual accounting reports to HHS, 
cooperate with HHS investigations, and 
submit to federal audits . If HHS finds 
serious misconduct in a state’s operation 
of the exchange, HHS may rescind up 
to 1 percent of all the money that HHS 
owes to the state under all programs HHS 
administers .
Transparency . On the Internet, the 
exchange must publish the average cost 
of all payments required by the exchange 
(including licensing and regulatory fees), 
the administrative costs incurred by the 
exchange, and an accounting of all funds 
lost to waste, fraud and abuse .  
The interaction between 
Medicaid, the exchange, 
and external sources 
of data in determining 
eligibility
HHS will need to flesh out a clear vision 
of Medicaid’s role in the determination 
of eligibility for subsidies in the exchange . 
But from PPACA’s statutory language, the 
following seems clear:
•	A single application form will be used 
for all three need-based health-coverage 
programs—Medicaid, CHIP, and subsidies 
in the exchange .25 HHS will promulgate 
a national form, but a state can use its 
own version, if approved by HHS . A 
consumer can file the form with an agency 
administering one of these programs either 
in-person, on line, by phone, or by mail . 
•	Depending on how HHS interprets 
the statute, the exchange will probably 
determine eligibility for advance payment 
of tax credits subsidizing premiums and 
for out-of-pocket cost-sharing subsidies 
in the exchange . IRS directly pays these 
credits and subsidies to health plans when 
premiums are due . Plans bill individuals 
for their share of the premium, unless 
the exchange arranges to collects such 
payments and forward them to insurers .   
•	No matter how or where the application 
form is filed, all the relevant agencies work 
together “behind the scenes” to ascertain the 
appropriate program for the applicant . As 
a result, without completing any additional 
forms, the applicant learns about each 
program for which members of his or her 
family qualify .  
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•	Data-matching systems must be 
established that let all health agencies 
exchange information from the 
application form and determine 
eligibility . These systems also gather 
information from a broad range of 
external sources to establish and to 
confirm eligibility, including the data 
currently used to verify income eligibility 
for Medicaid, federal income tax data, 
and information from eligibility files of 
need-based public benefit programs . 
•	Generally speaking, the same tax-based 
definitions of income eligibility apply to 
all programs, including Medicaid, CHIP, 
and subsidies in the exchange—namely, 
Modified Adjusted Gross Income 
(MAGI), which is defined as Adjusted 
Gross Income under federal income tax 
law, plus tax-exempt interest and certain 
tax-exempt income earned while living 
abroad . However, there are potential 
differences in the applicable time frame . 
Eligibility for subsidies in the exchange 
is based on prior-year federal income tax 
data, unless the applicant comes forward 
and shows a change in circumstances . If, 
at the end of the year, someone turns out 
to have received the incorrect amount 
of premium subsidies in the exchange, 
any differences are reconciled on the 
person’s federal income tax return . 
The reconciliation process has one 
“safe harbor” limitation, however . If a 
consumer with income below 400 percent 
FPL, as shown on the tax return, received 
excessive premium subsidies during the 
year, the maximum amount that can 
be required for repayment is $250 or 
$400, for individual and joint tax filers, 
respectively .26  By contrast, Medicaid 
eligibility is generally based on income at 
the time the application is processed . This 
issue is discussed in more detail below .
The Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation
PPACA Section 3021 establishes this 
new Center and appropriates $10 billion 
through 2019 to fund demonstration 
projects . Starting in 2011, the Center will 
test innovative payment and delivery 
arrangements to improve quality and 
slow cost growth in Medicaid, CHIP, and 
Medicare, without regard to normal budget 
neutrality requirements . HHS is authorized 
to expand successful models to nationwide 
scale, after appropriate certification by the 
CMS Actuary . 
The Center is empowered to test any 
promising model . However, among the 
models specifically approved by PPACA are 
the following:
•	Promoting broad payment and practice 
reform in primary care, including the so-
called “Patient Centered Medical Home,” 
discussed in much more detail below;
•	Policies that move away from fee-for-
service reimbursement and toward 
comprehensive payment or salary-based 
payment; 
•	Supporting care coordination for 
chronically-ill individuals through 
methods that incorporate health 
information technology (HIT), a chronic 
disease registry, and home tele-health 
technology; 
•	Establishing community-based health 
teams to support small-practice medical 
homes by assisting the primary care 
practitioner in chronic care management, 
including patient self-management 
activities;
•	Helping patients make informed health 
care choices by paying providers for using 
patient decision-support tools; 
•	Letting states test and evaluate fully 
integrating care for dual eligible 
individuals in the state, including the 
management and oversight of Medicare 
and Medicaid funds (see page 38); 
•	Letting states test and evaluate systems of 
all-payer payment reform for the medical 
care of their residents;
•	Models that do not require a physician 
to be involved in establishing the plan of 
care for the service, when such service is 
furnished by another health professional 
authorized to do so under state law; and
•	Establishing comprehensive payments to 
Healthcare Innovation Zones, consisting 
of a teaching hospital, physicians, 
and other clinical entities that deliver 
a full spectrum of integrated and 
comprehensive health care services to 
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries 
while providing innovative medical 
training .
Because of this Center, states can now 
propose to CMS policy approaches that 
incorporate Medicare and Medicaid within 
broader state initiatives that address health 
care transparency, quality, or value .  
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PPACA gives states an opportunity to 
dramatically reduce the number of 
uninsured, improving access to essential 
health care . As explained earlier:
•	Medicaid expands to 138 percent FPL 
for children and adults, with income 
determined based on MAGI . 
•	For 2014 through 2016, the Federal 
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) 
applicable to newly eligible adults pays 
100 percent of all costs . After that, 
the percentage gradually declines to 
90 percent in 2020 and later years . 
For purposes of claiming this greatly 
enhanced FMAP, newly eligible adults 
are defined as those who would have 
been ineligible for their state’s Medicaid 
program on December 1, 2009 . Other 
adults qualify for standard Medicaid 
matching rates .  
•	Tax credits subsidize premiums for 
individuals with incomes at or below 
400 percent FPL who receive coverage 
through the exchange, provided that 
such individuals lack affordable access 
to minimally comprehensive employer-
sponsored insurance (ESI) . These 
credits seek to make it affordable for an 
individual to enroll in the second-lowest-
cost “silver” plan .  Additional subsidies 
reduce out-of-pocket costs for those with 
incomes at or below 250 percent FPL . The 
subsidies do this by raising the level of 
coverage to a higher actuarial value .  
•	In 2013 and 2014, Medicaid 
reimbursements rise to Medicare levels 
for certain primary care services . The 
federal government pays 100 percent  
of the resulting increased costs for these 
two years .  
For these provisions to achieve their goals, 
state action in three areas described below 
may be particularly useful: 
•	Helping eligible individuals enroll in and 
retain subsidized coverage;
•	Improving affordability and continuity of 
coverage for low-income adults who are 
ineligible for Medicaid; and
•	Increasing access to care within Medicaid . 
One preliminary caution is important . 
Many of the strategies discussed below will 
depend on how HHS interprets applicable 
statutory language . The analysis in this 
section is based on a careful reading of 
PPACA, but there is no guarantee that CMS 
will agree with the author on the meaning 
of many admittedly unclear provisions . 
Helping eligible 
individuals enroll in and 
retain subsidized health 
coverage
Several state strategies will be important to 
maximizing eligible residents’ enrollment 
and retention . 
Public education and facilitated 
enrollment
The importance of public education and 
efforts to facilitate enrollment is illustrated 
by Massachusetts’ experience expanding 
coverage following its 2006 enactment of 
reforms, which reduced the percentage of 
uninsured to the lowest level ever recorded 
in any state . The enactment of subsidies 
coupled with an individual mandate was 
not enough, by itself, to achieve that result . 
Additional important factors included:27
•	A major public education campaign 
involving both earned and paid media, 
partnering with local foundations, 
the Boston Red Sox, and major local 
corporations;  
•	Several years of “mini-grants” 
(supplemented by foundation support) to 
trusted community-based organizations 
(CBOs), which played a critically 
important role educating hard-to-reach 
consumers about how to obtain coverage 
and which completed application forms 
on behalf of consumers; and
•	State policies forbidding uncompensated 
care payments to safety net providers 
unless application forms for health 
coverage were completed by or on behalf 
of the providers’ patients . This policy 
applies, among other things, to the state’s 
payments to Disproportionate Share 
Hospitals (DSH) .
Using a single application form for 
multiple programs (including for 
uncompensated care payments to safety 
net providers), the state created an 
on-line application portal for use by 
trained CBOs and provider staff . As an 
automatic part of the application process, 
consumers were invited to appoint these 
application assisters as their authorized 
representatives throughout the eligibility 
determination process . As a result, the 
application assisters received copies of 
state correspondence asking for additional 
eligibility information . This let them work 
with consumers to respond satisfactorily 
to the state’s requests . More than half of all 
successful applications were completed, not 
by consumers, but by CBOs or health care 
providers acting on the consumers’ behalf .
Other states have used different models 
for facilitated enrollment . For example, 
California’s certified application assisters 
(CAA) have received payments of $60 (at 
initial enrollment) and $50 (at annual 
renewal) for each family whose children 
successfully enroll in Medicaid or CHIP 
thanks to the CAA’s efforts;28 and New York 
contracts with community agencies and 
safety net providers to act as Facilitated 
Enrollers helping consumers enroll and retain 
coverage .29 Wisconsin has likewise developed 
Maximizing Residents’ Health Coverage  
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a noteworthy system for helping consumers 
complete the application process .30 However 
a state establishes a system of facilitated 
enrollment and retention, it is critically 
important to maximizing eligible individuals’ 
receipt of coverage . 
Under PPACA, the principal vehicle for 
public education and facilitated enrollment 
is through the exchange . Perhaps the most 
important period for these functions 
will be through the end of 2014—that is, 
during preparation for and the first year 
of full implementation . Fortunately, the 
development and operation of exchanges will 
be supported by federal dollars until 2015 . 
States could use these federal resources, 
partnering with foundations and 
corporations, to conduct public education 
and to establish a program of enrollment 
facilitation . If a state implements 
Massachusetts’ strategy of denying access to 
DSH funds except with patients for whom 
a hospital completes an application form, 
it would be important to work closely with 
community advocates to ensure that such 
forms do not deter use of emergency hospital 
care by immigrants and other consumers who 
will not qualify for or do not want subsidies . 
A state could also encourage hospitals 
to participate in PPACA’s presumptive 
eligibility system . 31 However, to establish 
ongoing eligibility, consumers must 
complete the full application process, 
a step that many have failed to take 
under previous presumptive eligibility 
procedures . Hospital-based presumptive 
eligibility could be an important policy tool 
that lets hospitals qualify their patients for 
Medicaid coverage of emergency hospital 
care, but for ongoing access to care, 
additional steps will be needed . 
Public education and facilitated enrollment 
efforts may help to fulfill states’ duty, 
under PPACA, to conduct outreach and 
enrollment for vulnerable populations, 
including racial and ethnic minorities, 
children, pregnant women, people with 
HIV/AIDS, etc .32
Application forms and procedures
PPACA provides that a single application 
form will be used for Medicaid, CHIP, and 
subsidies in the exchange . As explained above, 
federal authorities will develop a form, but a 
state can create and use a substitute form that 
meets federal standards . 
Depending on how HHS interprets the 
relevant statutory provisions, following 
are state strategies involving application 
procedures that could eliminate potential 
enrollment barriers:
Application forms could be limited to 
questions that are relevant to determining 
eligibility, as provided in PPACA Section 
1411(g)(1) .33 This seemingly straightforward 
rule-of-thumb may encounter some 
obstacles . The first involves states’ need to 
identify “newly eligible” adults for whom 
the state can claim enhanced FMAP . For 
some beneficiaries, information irrelevant 
to eligibility will be needed to see whether 
they would have been ineligible for Medicaid 
under the state’s 2009 rules and so can qualify 
as “newly eligible .”  For example, parents 
with incomes that may be34 low enough to 
qualify for Medicaid under 2009 rules could 
nevertheless be newly eligible in 2014 because 
of assets that would have disqualified them 
in 2009 . If states asked such parents about 
assets as part of the application process in 
2014 and later years, the process of enrollment 
would become substantially more difficult . 
Many eligible consumers would not complete 
the application, and states would be forced 
to spend limited administrative resources 
verifying applicants’ claims about assets . 
States need not use application forms to 
request this information, which will be 
irrelevant to eligibility . Instead, states could 
claim enhanced federal match based on a 
statistically valid sample of the entire caseload 
of potentially income-eligible parents, using 
procedures like those used to determine 
Medicaid error rates . The HHS Departmental 
Appeals Board has repeatedly approved state 
claims for federal matching funds that were 
based on such sampling .35
A second obstacle to limiting application 
forms to questions relevant to eligibility36 
involves states’ interest in identifying 
“newly eligible” adults to determine the 
appropriate benefit package. Rather than 
provide standard Medicaid benefits, 
PPACA limits newly eligible adults to 
“benchmark coverage described in 
[Social Security Act] section 1937(b)
(1) or benchmark equivalent coverage 
described in section 1937(b)(2) .”37 On 
its face, this provision creates a need for 
states to distinguish between newly eligible 
adults, who receive “benchmark” benefits, 
and other adults, who receive standard 
coverage . For potentially income-eligible 
parents, this may create a need to assess 
factors like assets and deprivation of 
parental support, which will be irrelevant 
to eligibility in 2014 and later years . 
To avoid this problem, a state could furnish 
newly eligible adults with the same benefits 
it provides to other adults . One category 
of benchmark coverage is “Secretary-
approved coverage,” defined as “[a]ny other 
health benefits coverage that the Secretary 
determines, upon application by a State, 
provides appropriate coverage for the 
population proposed to be provided such 
coverage .”38 Both before and after the passage 
of PPACA, states have received CMS approval 
to provide full Medicaid benefits as “Secretary 
approved” benchmark coverage under Section 
1937 .39 If states provide the same benefits to 
all adults, they will not need to distinguish 
the newly eligible before deciding the benefits 
that particular adults receive . As a result, 
they will not need to gather and process 
information about assets and other facts that 
will ultimately be irrelevant to eligibility .40
Consumers could apply by authorizing 
disclosure of relevant data already 
in government hands, rather than by 
completing application forms that, in 
effect, tell the government what it already 
knows . PPACA Section 1413(c)(2)(B)(ii)
(II) provides that, for Medicaid, CHIP, 
and subsidies in the exchange, eligibility 
is determined based on data when an 
individual applies “by requesting a 
determination of eligibility and authorizing 
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disclosure of … information [described in 
Social Security Act Sections 1137, 453(i), 
and 1942(a)] … to applicable State health 
coverage subsidy programs for purposes of 
determining and establishing eligibility .” 
Such disclosure and data-based eligibility 
determination is quite wide-ranging:
•	Section 1137 describes information 
accessible through the Income and 
Eligibility Verification System, or IEVS, 
including information from the IRS, the 
Social Security Administration, state 
quarterly wage records and new hires 
data, and immigration status information 
available from the Department of 
Homeland Security through the 
Systematic Alien Verification for 
Entitlements (SAVE) Program . 
•	Section 453(i) describes the National 
Directory of New Hires . NDNH 
combines quarterly wage records and new 
hires data from all states and the federal 
government .41
•	Section 1942(a) describes eligibility files 
maintained by public benefit programs, 
state income tax records, state records about 
private insurance coverage maintained for 
purposes of Medicaid Third Party Liability 
enforcement, and vital records data about 
births in any state .  
Enrollment would be substantially 
simplified if, rather than complete an 
application form, a consumer could simply 
identify all uninsured members of his or 
her household, provide social security 
numbers to permit data matching, and sign 
a form that requests information disclosure 
to establish eligibility for subsidized 
coverage . Such a highly streamlined 
procedure would not end the need for 
more traditional application forms, since 
some people may be uncomfortable with 
the required disclosure or may need to 
provide information not available in 
government records . But it would provide 
an important route to subsidized coverage 
that could increase participation rates by 
greatly simplifying the application process . 
Medicaid eligibility rules
Depending on how CMS interprets 
PPACA, two Medicaid eligibility policies 
could substantially streamline eligibility 
determination and enrollment .
Basing eligibility on receipt of other 
benefits . PPACA explicitly allows states 
to continue extending Express Lane 
Eligibility (ELE) to children .42 ELE permits 
states to qualify children for Medicaid 
and CHIP based on the findings of other 
need-based programs or state income tax 
records, notwithstanding methodological 
differences in determining income . But 
another PPACA provision appears to 
give states an additional option to qualify 
children and adults for Medicaid based on 
the findings of other need-based programs . 
New Social Security Act Section 1902(e) 
 
(13)(D)(i)(I)43 provides that MAGI is not 
used to determine eligibility for: 
“[i]ndividuals who are eligible for 
medical assistance … on a basis that 
does not require a determination 
of income by the State agency 
administering the State plan …, 
including as a result of eligibility for, or 
receipt of, other Federal or State aid or 
assistance, individuals who are eligible 
on the basis of receiving (or being 
treated as if receiving) supplemental 
security income benefits [SSI] … , and 
individuals who are eligible as a result 
of being or being deemed to be a child 
in foster care under the responsibility 
of the State .”  (Emphasis added .)  
This language implies that a state can qualify 
someone for Medicaid based on their receipt 
of federal or state benefits other than SSI . 
CMS will need to rule on the meaning of this 
language, of course . But it would be logical, 
in view of Medicaid’s increased eligibility to 
138 percent FPL, to permit states to provide 
Medicaid to residents who have already 
qualified for benefits like the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, the 
program formerly known as “Food Stamps”) 
or General Assistance, since recipients of the 
latter benefits almost certainly will be income-
eligible for Medicaid .44
Basing eligibility on data . For subsidies 
in the exchange, prior-year income tax 
records determine eligibility . For Medicaid, 
by contrast, PPACA provides that the 
requirement to use MAGI in calculating 
eligibility “shall not be construed as 
affecting or limiting the application of the 
requirement under [federal Medicaid law] 
and under the State plan…to determine 
an individual’s income as of the point in 
time at which an application for medical 
assistance…is processed .”45 
Clearly, this provision means that someone 
who qualifies for Medicaid based on 
current economic circumstances must be 
granted eligibility . But does it also mean 
that, unless an applicant documents 
current income levels by presenting, for 
example, pay stubs or unless the state 
accepts self-attestation of current income, 
Medicaid eligibility must be denied, even if 
all available data show income eligibility? 
After all, income data, by definition, 
describe household circumstances at some 
point in the past . 
If this provision bars the establishment of 
Medicaid eligibility based on data, state 
administrative costs will rise, because 
manual procedures will be needed to 
determine eligibility .  This is a significant 
consideration given the enormous 
expansion in Medicaid eligibility that will 
take place starting in 2014 . 
Such a statutory interpretation would also 
mandate a more cumbersome process of 
establishing eligibility for Medicaid than 
for subsidies in the exchange . In effect, 
while eligibility for exchange subsidies 
would be established on the proverbial 
information superhighway, eligibility 
for the poorest uninsured would be 
determined via the data equivalent of ox 
carts and horse-drawn carriages .  
Fortunately, CMS could interpret this statute 
differently . A state could be allowed to 
qualify someone for Medicaid if eligibility 
is established based on either the most 
recent available data (including prior year 
income tax data, quarterly earnings records, 
and new hires data) or the applicant’s 
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demonstration of income at the time the 
Medicaid application is processed . Under 
this approach, if the data-based methods 
used in the exchange establish that someone 
meets Medicaid’s eligibility standards, the 
applicant receives Medicaid, without any 
need to take additional action . Only if such 
methods fail to establish Medicaid eligibility 
would an applicant need to come forward 
and demonstrate current income levels, 
with income verified by the state . Such an 
approach would be consistent with PPACA’s 
requirement, “to the maximum extent 
practicable, to determine … eligibility on 
the basis of reliable, third party data .”46 It 
would also be consistent with states’ current 
flexibility to use “less restrictive eligibility 
methodologies,” which CMS has already 
found applicable to PPACA’s new Medicaid 
category for childless adults .47
Eligibility determination infrastructure
As explained above, PPACA48 envisions 
an integrated eligibility determination 
system . One application form is to be used 
to seek coverage through Medicaid, CHIP, 
and subsidies in the exchange . Wherever 
the application is filed, all agencies work 
together “behind the scenes” to assign each 
household member to the appropriate 
subsidy program, without any need 
for the applicant to provide additional 
information . 
Such an approach has been an important 
factor in Massachusetts’ accomplishment 
of high participation rates in Medicaid 
and other subsidy programs . That state’s 
Medicaid agency contracts with several 
other agencies to determine eligibility for 
multiple programs, including the state’s “free 
care pool,” the state’s new “Commonwealth 
Care” benefit, and a health coverage program 
for immigrant children . All programs use 
a common eligibility methodology and a 
single application form . A statewide Medicaid 
office uses computer-driven logic, rather than 
traditional caseworker discretion, to establish 
eligibility .  Not only has this approach helped 
raise participation rates to high levels, it 
allowed the state to more than double its 
caseload with less than a 10 percent increase 
in staff, even before the 2006 reforms .49 
PPACA expressly permits states to replicate 
Massachusetts’ approach by having state 
Medicaid agencies determine eligibility for 
tax credits and out-of-pocket cost-sharing 
subsidies that apply in the exchange .  
To function effectively in the data-driven 
eligibility environment envisioned by 
PPACA, most states will need a substantial 
upgrade to the computer systems used to 
determine eligibility . Under regulations 
dating back to the 1970s, enhanced 
federal matching payments for “Medicaid 
Management Information Systems” are 
limited to computer systems that process 
provider claims; enhanced funding is not 
available for information technology used 
to establish eligibility .50 For this reason, 
eligibility systems are typically outdated . 
Fortunately, PPACA Section 1561 may 
provide a source of funding for states 
to establish eligibility systems that fit a 
data-driven eligibility model . This section 
requires HHS, within 6 months of statutory 
enactment, to promulgate standards and 
protocols that facilitate enrollment into 
Federal and State health and human services 
programs . It also provides grants to states and 
localities to upgrade their technology systems 
to implement those federally promulgated 
standards and protocols . 
It is not yet clear precisely what 
requirements and matching rates will 
apply to these state and local grants . HHS’ 
implementation of this section will thus be 
critically important to track, particularly 
given most states’ severe budget constraints . 
Improving affordability 
and continuity of 
coverage for low-income 
adults who are ineligible 
for Medicaid
Some observers have expressed concerns 
that the new system of subsidies in the 
exchange will not be sufficient to make 
coverage and access to care affordable . For 
example, a single adult at 160 percent FPL 
earned $1,444 in monthly pre-tax income in 
2009 . Under PPACA, such an adult would 
be expected to pay 5 .4 percent of income 
in premiums, or $64 a month .51 Out-of-
pocket cost-sharing subsidies would allow 
the adult to receive coverage that could have 
office visit copays between $25 and $30 
and prescription drug copays between $10 
and $40, depending on the prescription .52 
Many at this income level could have great 
difficulty paying such premiums . Others 
may scrape together the money to pay 
premiums but then have difficulty with 
co-payments and deductibles, which could 
lead them to delay seeking care until health 
problems became severe . 
Another concern about coverage in the 
exchange is that, as household income 
fluctuates, beneficiaries could be shifted 
between Medicaid and subsidies in the 
exchange . Households could be changed, 
involuntarily, from one plan to another, 
and potentially from one doctor to another . 
Fortunately, states can take effective action 
to address these two problems . 
Making coverage affordable for 
residents with incomes too high for 
Medicaid
PPACA gives states the option to 
implement the Basic Health Program 
(BHP) for citizens and legally resident 
immigrants with incomes at or below 
200 percent FPL who are ineligible for 
Medicaid and CHIP . This includes adults 
with incomes between 138 and 200 percent 
FPL . It also includes legally resident 
immigrants who are ineligible for Medicaid 
because their legalization took place within 
the past five years .53 
A state implementing the BHP option 
contracts with health plans to provide 
consumers with coverage at least as affordable 
and comprehensive as subsidized coverage in 
the exchange . To fund these contracts, such 
a state receives 95 percent of what the federal 
government would have spent in tax credits 
and other subsidies for BHP enrollees . 
This gives states the ability to provide 
Medicaid-style coverage to adults up to 200 
percent FPL, with no more than nominal 
premiums and out-of-pocket costs . In most 
states, per capita federal payments through 
this option will equal or exceed the average 
cost of Medicaid coverage for adults .54 
15
Medicaid can achieve this efficiency in 
part because of provider payment rates far 
below private levels . The disadvantage of 
the BHP option is thus that beneficiaries 
will not gain access to the broader provider 
networks likely to characterize private plans 
offered in the exchange . States can lessen 
this problem by setting BHP cost-sharing 
between Medicaid and private levels . In 
this way, provider payments could be raised 
above Medicaid rates while keeping net 
per member per month costs at standard 
Medicaid levels . If federal payments exceed 
per capita Medicaid costs, states could also 
use the extra federal dollars to further raise 
reimbursement rates for BHP enrollees . 
But at the end of the day, policymakers may 
need to decide whether, for this particular 
low-income population, the access 
problems that result from commercial-
style cost-sharing in the exchange are more 
severe than the access problems that result 
from limited provider participation in a 
Medicaid-style plan .  
As an alternative method of making 
coverage more affordable, states could 
supplement federal subsidies in the 
exchange . Such supplements would 
lower premium costs, deductibles, and 
copayments for low-income adults 
ineligible for Medicaid . To limit the 
resulting cost, a state could focus its 
resources on the very lowest-income 
exchange participants, rather than 
extend aid all the way to 400 percent 
FPL . Compared to the BHP alternative, 
this strategy would have the advantage 
of offering access to greater provider 
networks in the exchange . However, the 
countervailing disadvantage is that, unlike 
with the BHP option, state General Fund 
dollars would be needed . 
On balance, for most states, the BHP 
option may prove the most feasible strategy 
to improve access to care for the very  
 
lowest-income residents who are ineligible 
for Medicaid .
Improving continuity of coverage  
and care
Low-income households experience 
frequent fluctuations in income, which 
could shift beneficiaries between Medicaid 
and subsidized coverage in the exchange . 
Such shifts could cause involuntary 
movement from plan to plan, which in 
turn could require a change of providers, 
disrupting continuity of care . 
Massachusetts avoided this problem by 
using the same plans to serve Medicaid 
beneficiaries and recipients of the state’s 
new “Commonwealth Care” subsidies, 
available up to 300 percent FPL . A state 
could take a similar approach under 
PPACA, encouraging Medicaid plans to 
participate in the exchange (and BHP, if 
the state elects that option) . In that way, as 
household income rises or falls, a family 
could stay in the same plan and continue to 
see the same doctors, even as the applicable 
premium payments and out-of-pocket 
cost-sharing rules change .  Such plans need 
not be the only option in the exchange, but 
as long as they are available, families have 
the ability to maintain continuous coverage 
throughout the full spectrum of subsidy 
eligibility . 
Increasing access to care 
within Medicaid 
As noted previously, low provider 
reimbursement rates often translate 
into reduced provider participation and 
diminished access to care for Medicaid 
beneficiaries . To address this problem, PPACA 
provides full federal funding, in 2013 and 
2014, to increase Medicaid payments to 
Medicare levels for primary care providers 
furnishing “evaluation and management” 
services . While a very helpful start, this 
provision does not address access problems 
outside primary care, including dentistry, 
mental health, and specialty services . In 
addition, states would find it costly to sustain 
PPACA’s reimbursement rate increases if 
Congress fails to continue enhanced federal 
matching rates beyond 2014 . 
To some degree, PPACA lessens the extent 
of this problem by increasing funding for 
community health centers, school-based 
health centers, and other infrastructure 
that can potentially serve Medicaid 
beneficiaries .55 But states could take 
additional steps to improve access to care . 
The most straightforward such step 
would increase Medicaid rates—a costly 
proposition, if applied across-the-board . 
Another strategy would encourage 
provider participation by expediting 
claims payment . Providers’ concerns about 
Medicaid’s delays and “hassles” may be 
less costly to address than the underlying 
fees . States could also increase the use 
of tele-medicine to serve rural Medicaid 
beneficiaries, who often experience the 
greatest difficulty finding providers . In 
addition, states could change their licensure 
laws to increase the range of services that 
non-physicians are allowed to provide 
within Medicaid and potentially outside it 
as well .  
Finally, it is worth noting that PPACA 
Section 2801 increases the purview of the 
Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access 
Commission (MACPAC) and authorizes 
FY 2010 funding . MACPAC’s charter now 
includes an ongoing analysis of access to 
care by children and adults in Medicaid 
and CHIP . MACPAC could thus play an 
important role in raising the visibility 
of Medicaid access issues nationally, as 
could the significant increase in Medicaid 
enrollment resulting from PPACA . This 
may create a climate that facilitates a 
helpful federal response that gives states 
additional resources to improve Medicaid 
beneficiaries’ access to care .
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A Quick Recap
How states can use PPACA to increase coverage and access to care 
•  Fund trusted community-based organizations to help low-income consumers apply for coverage 
and to provide effective public education. Federal dollars that support the establishment of 
health insurance exchanges can provide this assistance. States may also be able to leverage 
philanthropic contributions to supplement public dollars.
•  Implement PPACA’s option for hospital-based presumptive eligibility, while establishing 
procedures to ensure the follow-through needed for ongoing coverage.  
•  Limit application forms to questions that are relevant to eligibility, which means that such forms 
do not gather information needed to distinguish newly eligible adults from other eligible adults. To 
claim the enhanced FMAP that is limited to newly eligible adults, states can sample a statistically 
representative group of beneficiaries. And, by giving all adults the same covered benefits, states 
can eliminate the need to identify “newly eligible” adults before they complete their enrollment.
•  Give consumers the option to apply for Medicaid and other subsidies by authorizing disclosure of 
personal information, rather than by completing a traditional form.  
•  Automatically grant Medicaid eligibility when individuals have already been found eligible for other 
need-based benefits with income-eligibility standards that are below Medicaid’s new 138 percent 
FPL threshold.
•  Automatically grant Medicaid eligibility whenever the income-determination method used in 
the exchange shows income at or below 138 percent FPL. If prior-year tax data (perhaps 
supplemented by recent quarterly earnings information) show Medicaid eligibility, a consumer 
would not be required to present pay stubs or other proof of current income. 
•  Take advantage of new federal resources to upgrade eligibility systems. Such systems will help 
Medicaid work with the exchange seamlessly, “behind the scenes,” to decide applicants’ eligibility for 
all subsidy programs, based on available data.
•  Implement the Basic Health Program option to make coverage much more affordable for low-
wage workers and their families with incomes below 200 percent FPL—without imposing costs 
on the state.
•  Encourage Medicaid plans to offer coverage in the exchange, making it possible for low-income 
families to retain continuity of coverage and care when their incomes change and they shift 
between Medicaid and the exchange.
•  Improve Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to care by streamlining processing of provider claims, 
using tele-medicine to improve access to care in rural locations, increasing the range of services 
that non-physicians are allowed to provide, and (if future state budget conditions permit) raising 
Medicaid reimbursement rates.  
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The next three parts of this report include 
an exploration of how a state could 
structure its health insurance exchange 
to achieve various policy goals—namely, 
making health care and health insurance 
more like consumer-driven markets, 
increasing health insurers’ accountability, 
and reforming health care delivery to 
slow cost growth while improving or 
maintaining quality . 
That analysis presumes, of course, that the 
state operates the exchange . This section of 
the paper briefly discusses the advantages 
and disadvantages of a state running the 
exchange, rather than letting the federal 
government play that role . It also analyzes 
several basic approaches that a state 
could take to running an exchange, basic 
approaches that play out in how a state 
seeks to accomplish its policy goals . 
Should a state run its own exchange or 
allow the federal government to do so?
Much depends on whether a state chooses 
to operate the exchange that serves its 
residents . The advantage of such a choice 
is simple: the exchange can be a powerful 
tool for accomplishing state objectives . 
By contrast, if the federal government 
performs this function, decisions about 
the structure of the exchange might not 
fit optimally with state policy priorities . 
At the same time, a state operating its 
own exchange may be better positioned to 
coordinate eligibility determination with 
Medicaid than if the exchange is federally 
administered . 
On the other hand, running an exchange 
carries risks . These will be new institutions 
charged with difficult tasks . Further, 
exchanges must be self-financing starting 
in 2015 . The federal government will be 
defining the requirements exchanges must 
meet, without directly providing any of 
the necessary funding beyond the start-up 
phase .56 Whoever administers the exchange 
may face a tension between demands 
to keep fees low and demands for high-
quality customer service that meets federal 
standards .57 
Without doubt, states will resolve this issue 
differently . And even within states, officials 
will have varying perspectives on how 
to weigh the risks and benefits of taking 
charge of an exchange . 
Basic approaches to administering an 
exchange
A critical feature of PPACA’s exchange 
provisions is that a state can either (a) permit 
all qualified plans to offer coverage or (b) 
exclude qualified plans based on the state’s 
view of the best interests of individuals and 
firms using the exchange . This leaves room 
for very different approaches . One useful 
source58 uses three categories to describe how 
exchanges can be run: 
“Market organizer:59 under this model, 
the exchange acts as an impartial source 
of information on health plans that are 
available in the market; [and] provides 
structure to the market to enable 
consumers to compare health plans and 
purchase coverage… Although not yet fully 
developed, the Utah Exchange provides an 
example of this kind of model .”
“Selective contracting agent: this model 
includes many of the same functions 
noted above, but also attempts to 
influence the market and enhance 
competition by contracting with a 
select group of carriers and offering a 
limited number of health plans . The 
exchange solicits health plans based 
on plan design parameters established 
by the administrators of the exchange . 
However, the exchange does not 
necessarily negotiate premiums with 
the health carriers . . .The Massachusetts 
Connector … uses a selective 
contracting approach for its commercial 
offerings . . .”
“Active purchaser: an exchange might also 
play a more active role in the market by 
establishing plan designs and purchasing 
health insurance much like a large 
employer procures health benefits on 
behalf of its employees .…Many of the 
health purchasing cooperatives that were 
established in the 1990s, such as California’s 
PacAdvantage … and the Texas Insurance 
Purchasing Alliance (TIPA), are examples 
of active purchaser models .”
Developed before the passage of PPACA, 
this typology still applies:
•	An exchange that offered all qualified 
plans would be a market organizer; 
•	If qualified plans were required to meet 
specified design parameters before they 
could be offered in the exchange, the 
exchange would be a selective contracting 
agent; and 
•	If the exchange went beyond a statement 
of design parameters to negotiate with 
qualified plans seeking to offer coverage, 
the exchange would be an active 
purchaser .
Fundamental Questions About Health  
Insurance Exchanges
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Basic perspective
Some observers believe that a central flaw 
of the present system central is its failure 
to embody two characteristics of a healthy 
market:60 buyers choose between goods 
and services with clearly understood 
costs and benefits; and the individual or 
entity making the purchasing decision 
experiences all of the resulting costs and 
benefits . With those two conditions in 
place, sellers increase their market share  
by giving purchasers the products they 
want at a price they can afford . From  
this perspective, nimble private innovation, 
rather than government fiat, meets 
consumers’ needs while holding  
down cost .61
One reason why these conditions 
rarely apply to American health care is 
that consumers usually lack essential 
information . Most Americans receive 
insurance through their employers, with the 
firm covering a significant share of costs; 
many consumers don’t even know how 
much their employers pay . A consumer 
buying coverage on the individual market 
typically cannot obtain a copy of the 
insurance policy document before enrolling . 
When consumers seek care, they will 
eventually learn the copayment they are 
charged but almost never know the full cost 
of the service paid by the insurer . And even 
if a consumer enrolls in a high-deductible 
plan and so bears the full and direct expense 
of much care, it may be impossible to get 
advance price quotes from providers or to 
reliably compare their past performance . 
Put simply, much better information about 
the cost and benefits of potential options 
is available when consumers choose a 
microwave oven than when they make much 
more consequential decisions about a health 
plan, a hospital, or a health care procedure .
Further, the entity or individual deciding 
about health coverage rarely experiences 
the resulting costs and benefits . With ESI, 
the employer chooses the health plan, but 
it is the employee who reaps the benefits 
and, according to most labor economists, 
pays the cost in the form of lower wages .62 
Further, with health plans that have low 
deductibles and limited copayments, 
consumers obtain all the benefits of the 
services they choose but consumers pay 
out of pocket only a small fraction of the 
resulting health care cost . 
To address these fundamental flaws, 
PPACA provides new tools that help 
state officials move toward a system that 
empowers each consumer with accurate, 
useful information and the authority to 
make health care choices that reflect the 
individual consumer’s preferred balance 
between costs and benefits .  
State policy options
State leaders interested in pursuing this 
basic approach can focus on (a) improving 
information about price and quality, so 
individuals can more effectively make 
decisions about care and coverage; and (b) 
implementing health insurance exchanges 
in a fashion that increases the role played 
by consumer choice . As noted in the 
Introduction, one additional strategy 
not discussed here involves the option, 
beginning in 2016, for states to enter into 
interstate compacts permitting the sale of 
health insurance across state lines .63 
Public information about price and 
performance
PPACA’s provisions
Following are examples of PPACA’s 
provisions that increase the public 
availability of reliable information about 
the performance of insurers and providers:
• Performance measures for both providers 
and plans . Sections 3013 through 3015 
of PPACA direct HHS to establish 
performance measures of quality and 
efficiency for plans and providers, to 
collect such data, and to make them 
publicly available .
•	Physicians . PPACA Sections 3002, 
10327, 10331, and 10332 strengthen 
the current system for evaluating 
quality and efficiency of physician 
performance under Medicare, giving 
physicians increased financial incentives 
to participate in that system, and making 
information available to consumers on a 
“Physician Compare” website operated by 
HHS . Information from other payors can 
be incorporated into this system, which 
HHS is authorized to extend to other 
providers . 
•	Hospitals . Section 3001 establishes a pay-
for-performance system for Medicare 
hospitals, through which quality and 
efficiency are rewarded with higher 
payment levels and the public learns 
about hospital performance on HHS’s 
“Hospital Compare” website . Section 
3025 adds to this website information 
about the rate at which patients served 
by particular hospitals are re-hospitalized 
soon after discharge .  In addition, the 
new Public Health Service Act §2718(e), 
added by PPACA Section 10101(f), 
requires hospitals to inform the public 
about their standard charges, as defined 
by HHS . 
• Health plans . PPACA Sections 2713(e)(3) 
(added by Section 10104), 2715A (added 
by Section 10101), 2717, and 2718 require 
health plans (including self-insured 
group plans) to provide a broad range 
of public information . These provisions 
require disclosure, in plain language, 
of claims payment policies, enrollment 
and disenrollment statistics, claim denial 
rates, rating practices, in-network and 
out-of-network cost-sharing, medical loss 
ratios, and initiatives to reform health 
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care delivery through care coordination, 
management of chronic illness, 
prevention, and other measures that 
improve health outcomes . Section 2715 
requires health plans to describe covered 
benefits and out-of-pocket costs using 
an easily understood, readily compared 
format developed by HHS . 
•	Medical Reimbursement Data Centers . 
New Public Health Service Act Section 
2794(c)(1)(C) and Section 2794(d), 
added by PPACA Section 10101(i), 
provide for the establishment of Medical 
Reimbursement Data Centers . Such 
Centers can be funded from PPACA’s 
$250 million appropriation slated 
for building state capacity to analyze 
insurance premiums . These new data 
centers are either academic or non-profit 
institutions that collect, analyze, and 
report information about local payment 
rates, including information to help 
consumers understand the amounts that 
health care providers in their area charge 
for particular services .  
Opportunities for state action
In implementing PPACA, states can 
leverage these national initiatives to 
make major improvements in consumer 
information .  Critically important will be 
combining information about performance 
and price in one place—a consumer health 
information website, perhaps as part 
of the exchange web portal . This would 
permit consumers selecting a health plan, 
a hospital, a physician, or other health care 
provider to easily compare the potential 
costs and benefits of each choice . Such a 
comparison ideally includes information 
about results achieved (including health 
outcomes as well as other measures), price 
(that is, cost per service), and efficiency 
(the number and nature of services 
provided for a given condition) . In one 
approach proposed by Harvard Business 
School professor Michael Porter, states 
might eventually provide consumers with 
information about competing provider 
teams’ risk-adjusted outcomes and costs 
over the entire cycle of caring for patients 
with a particular diagnosis .64 
PPACA could make it easier for states to 
provide consumers with good information 
about performance and cost . The federal 
legislation directs HHS to work with 
national stakeholder groups in tackling 
tough methodological issues that could 
otherwise obstruct state progress . One 
such issue involves adjusting performance 
data to compensate for patient risk, 
thereby avoiding unfair penalties when 
providers furnish good care but serve 
patients with prior conditions that make 
an adverse outcome more likely .  A similar 
issue involves the need to avoid judging 
individual physicians and other providers 
based on outcomes with relatively small 
patient caseloads, where a few random 
events can skew performance metrics . If 
HHS develops sound approaches, states 
could simply use them, avoiding the need 
to reinvent these difficult wheels .  
In addition to presenting information to 
consumers in a useful, integrated format, 
states could supplement the information 
made available through PPACA . For 
example:
•	While PPACA creates new mechanisms 
for assessing and reporting physician 
performance, it does not couple those 
mechanisms with information about the 
cost of receiving services from a particular 
office . A state could encourage physicians 
to furnish information about standard 
charges for an office visit, along with 
information about the health plans in 
which they participate . The state would 
then make that information available on 
its health consumer information website . If 
state officials feel strongly about providing 
consumers with the information they 
need to make good decisions, physician 
participation in such an information system 
could be a precondition for (a) having 
malpractice liability capped; (b) gaining 
preferred reimbursement rates from  
health plans covering public employees;  
or (c) licensure . 
•	Many of PPACA’s most far-reaching 
policies for gathering and reporting 
information about performance involve 
Medicare . States could build on this 
federal effort by collecting comparable 
data about quality and efficiency for 
other payors, public and private, using 
an All-Payer Claims Database .65 Such 
states would then work with HHS to 
combine this additional information with 
Medicare data and present the results 
to consumers, providing a fuller picture 
of provider and plan performance . A 
state could either: (a) adopt Medicare 
information-gathering strategies; or (b) 
seek approval from the CMS Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid innovation for 
modifying Medicare policies to fit state 
policy initiatives . 
•	Even though a health plan has more 
leverage than consumers to obtain lower 
prices from providers,66 a state may be 
interested in arming consumers with 
information about provider charges in 
particular localities so that, if they have 
high-deductible coverage, consumers 
can negotiate with providers around 
price . If so, state officials could prioritize 
establishment of a local Medical 
Reimbursement Data Center, which 
furnishes information about typical 
charges for particular services . To make 
such a Center most effective, a state could 
encourage or require insurers to furnish it 
with provider payment data .67  
In providing the public with information 
about results, quality, and efficiency, 
states would build on an extensive track 
record of prior work in this area .68 For 
example, the Pennsylvania Health Care 
Cost Containment Council publishes 
annual reports for each region of the state 
showing individual hospital performance 
with specific common diagnoses and 
procedures . As to each diagnosis and 
procedure, the Council provides risk-
adjusted information about each hospital’s 
average charges, length of stay, mortality, 
and likelihood of re-hospitalization .69 
Along similar lines, Florida’s Agency for 
Health Care Administration provides 
comparative information about hospitals, 
health plans, and prescription drug prices 
via its floridahealthfinder .gov website . 
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Several caveats are important . First, price 
data are not easy to interpret . The above-
described states, for example, display 
hospital charges, which far exceed what 
insurers typically pay . Health plans vary 
in payment amounts as well as consumer 
cost-sharing obligations, so a hospital’s 
charges may not be a reliable guide to 
what either a consumer or the consumer’s 
insurer will pay . At the same time, the 
distinction between a consumer’s cost-
sharing amount and the full price paid by 
the insurer complicates the issue that price 
information is intended to illustrate . While 
the individual consumer receiving the 
service directly pays only the cost-sharing 
amount, the full service cost paid by the 
insurer is ultimately borne by all of the 
insurer’s customers in the form of higher 
premiums (and in the case of ESI, the 
likelihood of lower wages) . 
On a website listing common outpatient 
procedures as well as inpatient labor and 
delivery, the state of New Hampshire 
addresses these problems by showing the 
amounts paid by insurers, using an All-
Payer Claims database, as well as helping 
consumers understand what they will 
directly pay . The state’s website allows a 
consumer to identify his or her health plan 
and provide information about deductible 
and co-insurance levels, after which the 
consumer receives an estimated cost that 
he or she will pay for the procedure .70  
More broadly, consumers often find 
information about health care price and 
performance confusing .71 It can be very 
challenging to present these data in a 
way that is easy to assimilate by most 
consumers, not to mention those who 
face special communications challenges, 
including general literacy problems or 
limited English proficiency . Even common 
difficulties understanding numbers and 
percentages can prevent consumers from 
processing simple information effectively .72 
Put simply, state officials interested in 
giving consumers data they can use need 
to pay careful attention to the details of 
communication strategy .
Finally, as an empirical matter, it is not 
clear that presenting consumers with 
information about quality or efficiency 
changes consumer choices appreciably .73 
Making such information publicly 
available often improves provider behavior, 
however, because of feared embarrassment, 
desired recognition, or concern about 
health plan, employer, or public agency 
responses .74 
Health insurance exchanges
Potential impact on market structure
Health insurance exchanges offer the 
potential to move health insurance 
purchasing decisions toward a classic 
market structure . Because consumers 
pay the increased cost of more generous 
insurance, they must trade off price and 
comprehensiveness, much as when they 
buy other goods and services . In such a 
system, plans seek market share by giving 
consumers what they want at a price they 
can afford .  And it is the consumer, not 
the employer, who chooses the plan and 
experiences the benefits while paying 
the marginal costs . For these reasons, 
the health insurance exchange run by 
the Federal Employees Health Benefits 
Program (FEHBP)—the country’s 
largest and oldest such exchange—has 
been described as involving “free market 
principles of real consumer choice,” 
“genuine market competition,” and “a 
serious consumer-driven market .”75 
Utah provides a second example of 
policymakers using exchanges to move 
toward a consumer-driven market for 
health insurance . Although Massachusetts’ 
exchange has received more public 
attention and covers many more people, 
Utah’s approach has been celebrated by 
some advocates of market-based reform 
strategies who have concerns about 
Massachusetts’ general approach .76 
In Utah, small firms can use the state’s 
exchange to provide their workers with 
coverage . While state officials ensure the 
availability of high-deductible plans that 
qualify for health savings accounts, plans 
may also offer any other combination of 
covered benefits and out-of-pocket cost-
sharing that is consistent with state law . 
To participate, an employer decides how 
much money it will contribute, and the 
firm’s workers pay the remainder of the 
premium when they select a plan offered 
in the exchange . Consumers must thus 
compare the cost of each plan with its 
appealing product features, making 
the kinds of choices and trade-offs that 
typify other markets . If several different 
firms employ a worker, each can make a 
contribution to the worker’s premium costs . 
The exchange began operating as a pilot in 
mid-2009 . Because of various problems, 
such as a significant differential between 
premiums inside and outside the exchange, 
fewer than 500 state residents had 
obtained coverage by January 1, 2010 .77 
In response, the state legislature modified 
the exchange during the 2010 legislative 
session to ensure (as under PPACA) that 
common rules, premiums, and risk-
adjustment mechanisms apply to small 
group plans, whether sold in the exchange 
or elsewhere .78 
While PPACA as a whole departs in 
important ways from Utah’s approach—for 
example, the federal law requires all plans, 
whether sold within or outside the exchange, 
to meet certain minimum benefit standards, 
and the federal law requires most individuals 
to obtain coverage—PPACA’s provisions 
that specifically address health insurance 
exchanges leave considerable room for state 
policymakers to move insurance markets 
toward a consumer-directed approach, as 
explained below . 
Opportunities for state action
Offering a broad range of health  
plan options
States interested in maximizing the 
potential offered by exchanges to create a 
consumer-driven marketplace could take 
several steps to broaden offerings in the 
exchange:
1 . Encourage insurers to offer plans at each 
of the actuarial value levels outlined in 
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PPACA . That would permit consumers 
to choose between high-deductible and 
more comprehensive plans, trading off 
the resulting cost differential against the 
importance of the additional protection 
offered by more generous coverage .
2 . Encourage plans at each AV level to 
innovate by offering a range of covered 
benefits and out-of-pocket cost-sharing 
rules . It remains to be seen how much 
this range will be constrained by federal 
requirements that each plan must cover 
certain essential services . PPACA clearly 
permits plans to vary cost-sharing 
amounts that apply to essential benefits 
(except on certain preventive care 
services) . HHS may also interpret the 
statute to allow plans to differentiate the 
amount, duration, and scope of coverage 
within mandatory service categories, 
much as occurs today with FEHBP .79  
3 . Permit all qualified plans to offer coverage 
in the exchange, thus maximizing 
consumer choices, rather than exclude 
qualified plans based on state decisions 
about the best interests of enrollees . Such 
an inclusive approach would leave it to 
the consumer (rather than the state) to 
decide, for example, whether premiums 
charged by a particular plan are too 
high .80 A state taking this approach would 
use the exchange as a “market organizer,” 
rather than a “selective contractor” or 
“active purchaser,” under the typology 
described previously .  
4 . Intervene to increase the range of health 
insurance options by encouraging one or 
more existing insurers to fill important 
gaps in local health plan offerings . For 
example, officials in Massachusetts’ 
exchange were initially concerned about 
premiums that were high because all 
insurers felt the need to contract with 
a small number of prestigious hospital 
systems that used their leverage to extract 
high reimbursement levels . To address 
this situation, the exchange encouraged 
insurers to offer plans that did not 
include those hospitals in their networks . 
Premiums for the resulting new plans 
were significantly lower than for older 
plans offering identical benefits .81 With 
increasing market concentration of 
hospital systems and resulting upward 
pressure on hospital rates,82 similar efforts 
in other states could be important to 
presenting consumers with options that 
lower health insurance costs by narrowing 
networks of participating providers .  
5 . Encourage or arrange the development 
of new insurers to increase competition 
among carriers . One such insurer could 
be a non-profit, consumer-owned 
health insurance “co-op,” providing 
consumers with an additional choice of 
plan . Such a new insurance option could 
be particularly important in the many 
states where very few carriers dominate 
insurance markets .83 PPACA provides $6 
billion in grant and loan funds to assist in 
the development of such insurance co-
ops . However, state officials should not be 
under the illusion that it will be easy for 
a new plan to get started, even with these 
federal resources . Without numerous 
covered lives, a new plan lacks the 
leverage to recruit numerous providers on 
favorable terms . As a result, the new plan 
can be forced to charge high premiums 
for a limited provider network that many 
consumers find unappealing . Another 
approach worth considering would have 
the state sponsor a publicly-administered 
health plan that begins with a large base 
of enrollment using Medicaid and CHIP 
beneficiaries, public employees, and 
public retirees . (see pages 26-27 for  
more detail) 
One final comment in this area is 
important . Before pursuing policies 
that maximize the number of health 
insurance choices, policymakers may want 
to consider research findings showing 
that, both with health insurance and 
other goods and services, presenting 
consumers with a vast array of choices 
can cause confusion . When consumers 
feel overwhelmed by more options than 
they can easily process—particularly when 
the differences between options involve 
multiple variables—many consumers 
become less responsive to each option’s 
costs and benefits, thus inhibiting 
the market’s effective functioning .84  
Policymakers need to decide whether their 
vision of an ideal health insurance market 
includes the maximum possible number of 
qualified choices or a smaller number with 
fewer variables, which may be easier for 
many consumers to understand . 
One possible middle ground would limit 
options in the exchange to a manageable 
number and variety while making clear, 
as provided by PPACA, that other plans 
are also available outside the exchange, 
perhaps directing consumers to websites 
with information about the latter plans .85  
Another possible middle ground approach 
would classify a subset of participating 
plans as “recommended,” in the same way 
that websites offering information about 
consumer products frequently indicate 
that certain products are among the 
“editor’s choices .” Such an approach could 
help clarify consumers’ decisions without 
eliminating options from the exchange . 
Giving consumers useful information to 
guide health plan choices
A state could go beyond PPACA’s 
minimum requirements to give consumers 
additional information about coverage 
offered through the exchange . For 
example, an exchange’s website could 
provide information about the following 
features of each plan:
•		Whether a consumer’s preferred physician, 
nurse, or clinic is part of the plan’s network 
and currently accepting new patients;
•		The formulary and cost-sharing status of 
particular prescription drugs; and
•		The risk-adjusted costs and results the plan 
achieves for consumers with particular 
medical diagnoses or conditions . 
States could also empower private groups 
to educate consumers about available 
options, as exemplified by FEHBP . 
Consumers Checkbook, an independent, 
non-profit information source, furnishes 
federal employees and retirees with 
information about available plans . The 
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Checkbook is so well-established that 
many federal agencies subsidize access to 
the guidebook for their employees and 
retirees .86 States could consider taking 
similar steps with the exchange, perhaps 
contracting with a private organization to 
present consumers with information about 
available health plans . 
One final caution is that states may 
need to work very hard ensuring that 
information presented to consumers is 
clear and simple . Massachusetts’ health 
exchange, for example, conducted 
extensive field research to determine the 
data most important to consumers . Clear, 
consistent displays of information in 
consumer-friendly ways proved critically 
important to shifting consumer purchases . 
Such displays, for the first time, allowed 
consumers to compare “apples to apples” 
and identify premium costs that did not 
yield commensurate increased value . 
As a result, consumers using the state’s 
exchange are more likely than traditional 
health insurance purchasers to enroll 
in “generic,” lower cost coverage87—a 
consumer-driven cost savings that other 
states could seek to facilitate . 
Increasing the number of consumers 
with access to the exchange 
One important strategy for increasing 
the number of firms and residents using 
the exchange involves insurance brokers 
and agents . Given the central role they 
currently play and the confidence they 
enjoy among many small firms and 
individuals, brokers and agents can be 
critically important to achieving high 
enrollment levels . Of course, states face a 
trade-off, as brokers must be paid a fee . 
Nevertheless, previous purchasing pools 
have found that, without brokers and 
agents actively participating in (rather 
than fighting against) a new purchasing 
arrangement, it can be very difficult for an 
exchange to gain traction .88
If states incorporate brokers and agents, 
it may be important to add rules ensuring 
that an agent receives the same fee, 
regardless of the health plan in which a 
consumer enrolls . Such a rule was adopted 
by both Utah and Massachusetts, where 
brokers receive a fixed fee per enrollee, 
regardless of plan choice . This lessens 
conflicts of interest by avoiding incentives 
to steer consumers to particular plans . In 
addition, states could lower fees below 
prior levels, since exchanges are likely to 
lower brokers’ average costs . 
States could also consider maximizing the 
number of firms allowed to buy coverage 
through the exchange by permitting 
firms with 100 or fewer workers to use 
the exchange, rather than limiting it to 
companies with 50 or fewer workers . As 
noted above, beginning in 2017, states 
could allow employers of any size to use 
the exchange . Such steps could increase the 
number of consumers who receive coverage 
through a more consumer-driven health 
insurance market than exists for most 
ESI today . Further, widespread employer 
participation in the exchange increases the 
likelihood that a worker can change jobs 
while retaining his or her preferred health 
plan . Such portability could yield important 
benefits, including incentives for health 
plans to invest in the long-term wellness of 
their members and an increased ability for 
workers to change jobs without disrupting 
continuity of coverage .89 
Structuring employer involvement
PPACA does not address many key 
questions about employers’ role in 
exchanges . This apparently gives states 
the flexibility to devise answers, subject 
to eventual regulations or guidance from 
HHS . Here are some important issues 
that may be left up to the states, along 
with some possible approaches and 
accompanying trade-offs:
•	How must employers structure their 
premium contributions if they wish to 
participate in the exchange? Do they pay 
a percentage of the premium or a flat 
dollar amount? In addressing this issue, 
states need to be aware of an important 
trade-off . The former approach may 
lessen risk segmentation among health 
plans,90 but the latter would give workers 
more of an incentive to select plans with 
lower premiums .91 
•	Must employers make a minimum level 
of contribution to premiums before they 
can offer coverage through the exchange? 
•	Are employers limited to a single 
actuarial value of coverage for their 
workers? Or can they give their workers 
a choice of AVs? (As noted previously, 
HHS may interpret PPACA to foreclose 
the latter option .) Giving workers access 
to more participating plans would, 
among other things, increase families’ 
ability to keep the same health plan 
even if they move from job to job with 
employers who provide varying levels 
of support for ESI . On the other hand, 
Massachusetts required each firm using 
that state’s exchange to select a single 
actuarial value that would apply to all 
of the firm’s employees, thus avoiding 
potential income-based disparities in 
coverage generosity92 and significant 
market distortions .93
•	May employers offer their workers 
options both within and outside the 
exchange? If so, must a certain threshold 
percentage of employees agree to 
coverage through the exchange before 
the firm is allowed to use the exchange? 
In the past, such a threshold percentage 
has been important to preventing 
adverse selection . But this policy may 
not be needed under PPACA if risk 
adjustments function as intended to 
encompass small group plans both 
within and outside the exchange . 
•	When one worker has several jobs, how 
(if at all) can the various employers 
make small premium contributions, if 
they wish to help their part-time and 
contingent workers afford insurance? 
An exchange could (if permitted by 
HHS’ interpretation of PPACA) accept 
contributions from multiple employers, 
as occurs with Utah’s exchange .  
•	To access the exchange, may employers 
give their workers the option to use pre-
tax dollars to pay their premium share? 
Must employers do so?94  
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A state’s policymakers could seek to 
resolve these questions by working closely 
with the state’s employer community to 
develop rules and procedures that make 
it simple and convenient for employers to 
participate while safeguarding the sound 
operation of the exchange according to 
market principles .
Final comments about exchanges
Several final comments about exchanges 
are important . First, states will need 
to structure an ongoing source of 
administrative funding that is stable and 
sufficient . Exemplifying one possible 
approach, the Massachusetts exchange 
charges a fee to participating insurers 
equal to 3 percent of premiums .95 The 
insurers then pass on this cost to the 
purchasers of coverage .96 
Second, exchanges under PPACA are likely 
to be much more durable and highly 
subscribed than has been the case for 
most health insurance purchasing pools in 
the past .97 That is because PPACA limits 
the use of tax credits and other subsidies 
for low-income, individual consumers 
to people who buy coverage through the 
exchange . Small employer tax credits 
will likewise be limited to exchange-
based coverage, beginning in 2014 . Also, 
PPACA requires each individual to obtain 
coverage, thus increasing the demand for 
health insurance . In addition, PPACA 
enacts health insurance reforms that 
prevent discrimination against consumers 
with health problems and that equalize 
premiums for health insurance sold 
inside and outside the exchange, thus 
addressing the adverse selection problems 
that have plagued some health insurance 
purchasing pools . Similar policies adopted 
in Massachusetts resulted in an exchange 
that covers 157,000 subsidized consumers 
plus 31,000 unsubsidized enrollees .98 
CBO likewise anticipates that 24 million 
individuals, or 9 percent of non-elderly 
Americans, will receive coverage through 
exchanges under PPACA .99 
Third, some observers have contrasted 
the small health insurance exchange 
that Utah began in 2009 with the much 
larger exchange that has operated in 
Massachusetts since 2006, suggesting 
that the Utah exchange involves a lighter 
public sector role than is present either in 
Massachusetts or under PPACA .100 A clear 
analysis of this contrast, however, shows 
that PPACA gives states considerable 
flexibility to pursue a market-oriented 
approach to health insurance exchanges, 
incorporating many of the key features of 
Utah’s exchange . 
Some of the differences between 
Massachusetts and Utah involve policy 
questions that PPACA has definitively 
resolved . For example, PPACA includes 
an individual mandate and definition of 
minimum required benefits, roughly along 
Massachusetts lines—neither of which 
directly concerns the operation of the 
exchange—and risk adjustments among 
health plans, roughly along Utah lines, to 
include small group plans both inside and 
outside the exchange . 
Other differences reflect choices that, in 
important ways, remain in state hands 
under PPACA . The federal law gives 
state the flexibility to run an exchange, 
not as a selective contractor or active 
purchaser, but as a market organizer—for 
example, by permitting all qualified plans 
to offer their products in the exchange, 
maximizing the number of consumers 
who use the exchange, encouraging 
the offering of diverse plan options, 
focusing state efforts on providing useful 
information to consumers, etc . 
Of course, an exchange can also take 
a more interventionist approach in 
excluding qualified plans from the 
exchange . The administrator of the 
exchange thus has a significant role 
determining the degree to which the public 
sector controls the insurance sold in the 
exchange .  
PPACA does impose regulatory constraints 
that go beyond those present in Utah—
perhaps most important, the requirement 
that all qualified plans must offer what the 
federal government identifies as “essential 
benefits .” That said, the use of actuarial 
value standards permits considerable 
variation and innovation by health 
insurers .101 Moreover, most responsibilities 
that PPACA imposes on exchanges are 
intended to help meet the needs of 
consumers and firms choosing from 
among competing, qualified, private plans . 
Put simply, market-oriented state 
policymakers can continue to pursue 
their policy goals to great effect as they 
implement this new federal legislation .  
But state policymakers who see exchanges 
as a policy lever to more aggressively 
transform health insurance and health care 
can pursue that goal as well, as described 
in the next section of this report . 
24
A Quick Recap
How states can use PPACA to make health insurance more like a smoothly 
functioning, consumer-driven market 
•  Combine federally-generated and state-generated information about price and performance in a 
single place that is easy for consumers to find. 
•  Present basic consumer information that is simple and user-friendly while making additional 
information easily available for those who want to dig deeper.
•  In presenting price information, help consumers learn the cost they must pay under their health 
plan, not just providers’ generic charges. 
•  Consider organizing information to show risk-adjusted costs and outcomes for provider teams’ 
treatment of particular conditions, throughout the full cycle of care. 
•  For state transparency initiatives, consider applying methodologies that HHS develops to address 
challenging issues, such as how to risk-adjust performance data. 
•  In providing consumers with information about physicians, consider combining federally-generated 
performance data with state-generated cost information.
•  Work with HHS to build an all-payer database with Medicare information about provider 
performance along with state-generated information about performance under private insurance.
•  Consider establishing a Medical Reimbursement Data Center to educate consumers about typical 
charges in their geographic area.
•  Encourage insurers to offer a broad variety of plans in the exchange, at each available actuarial value.
• Permit all qualified plans to offer coverage in the exchange, potentially accompanied by a 
designation of which plans are recommended by the exchange.    
•  Encourage one or more insurers to offer plans with limited provider networks that allow lower premiums. 
•  Provide consumers with useful information about their insurance options in the exchange, such as 
whether particular drugs are included in health plan formularies.
•  Increase the number of residents using the exchange by (a) letting brokers and agents sell exchange 
plans and (b) giving medium-sized firms access to the exchange. These steps would increase the 
number of residents receiving coverage where consumers (not employers) select their own health plan 
and pay the incremental difference in premium. In such a system, purchasers balance cost against 
desirable product features, as in other consumer-driven markets.
•  Collaborate with employers to design the exchange so that it works well for them. 
•  Consider the creation of new carriers to operate in the exchange, particularly in states where 
a small number of insurers dominate existing markets. A new carrier could involve either (a) a 
member-owned “co-op” or (b) a state-administered plan that begins with a critical mass of covered 
lives consisting of Medicaid beneficiaries and public employees.
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Basic perspective
Some state policymakers believe that 
vigorous, public action is needed for 
private insurers to furnish consumers 
with high-quality, affordable coverage, for 
reasons that include the following:
•		When enrollees use more care, a private 
insurer pays more in claims, and profits 
immediately drop . Even non-profit 
insurers have compelling financial 
reasons to maximize the proportion of 
premiums available to pay administrative 
costs, including executive salaries and the 
development of reserves . This creates an 
inherent short-term conflict of interest 
between insurer and consumer .  
•		In most states, insurance markets are 
dominated by a small number of carriers, 
weakening competitive pressures to 
improve customer service and slow 
cost growth .102 In addition, recent years 
have seen tremendous consolidation of 
hospital and physician systems, making 
it increasingly difficult for insurers to 
negotiate aggressively over payment 
rates .103
•		Insurers can realize enormous gains 
by avoiding the small percentage of 
consumers who generate the vast majority 
of health care costs .104 As a result, plans 
often compete by avoiding risk, rather 
than by providing superior service at an 
affordable price . To shed or steer clear of 
high-cost patients, insurers have engaged 
in such actions as cancelling policies when 
members get sick; or raising premiums, 
denying enrollment, or limiting covered 
services for people with preexisting 
conditions, sometimes inflicting serious 
harm on the very consumers who most 
need health coverage .105 
•		Insurance policies are complex legal 
instruments . Consumers are rarely 
informed about these policies’ details 
before enrolling in a health plan . And 
when information is provided—for 
example, in technical “explanation of 
benefit” boilerplate language that describes 
why claims have been denied and how 
consumers can appeal such denials—few 
consumers understand the information 
offered by insurers . Put simply, consumers 
and insurers do not engage on anything 
like a level playing field . 
•		Regardless of the cause, health insurers 
have a troubling track record . Many years 
of premium increases that far outstrip 
inflation and serious discrimination 
against people with health problems have 
engendered skepticism about health plan 
performance in the absence of strong 
regulatory intervention . 
To address these and other concerns, PPACA 
extensively reforms health insurance markets, 
with many of the strongest measures 
going into effect on January 1, 2014 . State 
governments are likely to play a central role 
in determining the extent to which these 
reforms succeed or fail .   
Much of PPACA imposes new legal duties 
on insurers . Once a state has modified its 
insurance statutes to fit federal law, these 
requirements can be enforced by state 
insurance commissioners, using current 
mechanisms . Insurers’ new duties have 
been discussed at length elsewhere,106 
including in the above summary of 
PPACA . And PPACA permits states to go 
beyond federal requirements in certain 
areas—for example, by increasing the 
percentage of premiums that must be 
spent on health care or by limiting the 
permissible extent of premium variation 
based on age . 
What has received much less discussion, 
however, are the new tools PPACA 
provides to hold insurers accountable; 
and states’ ability to increase competition 
in health insurance markets, including 
through offering state-based public plans . 
New tools to hold insurers 
accountable
PPACA creates several promising new 
accountability mechanisms . 
Data requirements 
In the past, insurance commissioners have 
not always found it easy to determine 
whether insurers were abiding by applicable 
legal requirements . Often, access to hard 
data has proven essential to detecting 
violations . For example, year-end audits have 
frequently been useful in assessing whether 
insurers were complying with state laws 
regulating insurance premiums . According 
to the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC):
“[NAIC’s] uniform nationwide 
reporting and auditing standards … 
allow states to compare the information 
provided in rate filings by companies to 
the audited financial statement of those 
companies . State insurance regulators 
have found that oversight, reporting 
and verification of compliance with 
the law are critical to protecting the 
consumer .”107
As noted earlier, PPACA now requires 
insurers to provide substantial new 
amounts of data concerning claims 
payment and denial, enrollment, 
disenrollment, provider participation, etc . 
Such data could prove critically important 
to spotting possible legal violations . For 
example, a plan with unusually high denial 
rates for certain claims could be targeted for 
investigation of potential failure to provide 
services included in the minimum benefits 
package . If a plan has high disenrollment 
rates involving consumers with high health 
care costs, that could signal potential 
discrimination based on health status . 
Holding Insurers Accountable to Consumers
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A very low volume of paid claims in a 
particular geographic area and specialty 
may flag a gap in a plan’s provider network . 
Not only are data more abundant 
under PPACA, potential violations in 
charging premiums should be easier to 
detect than in the past . Most states have 
allowed premiums to vary based on many 
individual factors, with permitted ranges 
for each factor . The resulting complexity 
has made it very difficult to determine 
whether premiums are being charged 
consistently with state law . By contrast, 
under PPACA, the only factors that will 
affect premiums in the individual market 
are age, geography, and smoking, making 
it much easier to see whether premiums fit 
the rules .   
Of course, nothing limits a state to the 
information required by PPACA . A 
state could require additional data from 
insurers, as a condition of licensure 
or access to the exchange .108 For 
example, a state could require detailed 
information about the number and 
nature of complaints and appeals filed 
by consumers, if such information is not 
already required by HHS .  
In gathering health plan performance 
information, whether mandated by federal 
or state law, a state needs to carefully 
structure its requests . For the data to be 
usable, a state would be well-advised to 
use the same, easy-to-compare forms for 
each health plan . Also, to lessen burdens 
on both health plans and regulators, state 
data requests need to be carefully targeted, 
seeking only relevant information .  
Finally, a state could make these data 
publicly searchable and available (albeit 
in carefully redacted form that avoids any 
disclosure of patient identity) .That would 
allow nongovernmental organizations, 
including consumer advocacy groups and 
researchers, to supplement the efforts of 
state regulators in identifying potential 
problems with health plan performance . It 
could also inform choice of health plan by 
employers and individuals .
 
The exchange 
A state can bar qualified plans from 
participating in the exchange based on 
the best interests of the consumers and 
businesses who use the exchange to obtain 
coverage . Accordingly, access to the many 
covered lives in the exchange can be a 
reward for good behavior by insurers . 
A state could thus limit the exchange 
to health plans whose performance 
exceeds minimum requirements in 
terms of quality, consumer satisfaction, 
or affordable premiums . A state that 
articulated these requirements and allowed 
plans to meet them would be classified as 
a “selective contracting agent,” under the 
typology described previously .
A state could be even more active by 
negotiating with insurers to arrange 
satisfactory terms . While Massachusetts 
is a “selective contracting agent” in 
the commercial market, it is an “active 
purchaser” when it comes to subsidized 
coverage in the exchange . Accordingly, that 
state’s exchange saved an estimated $21 
million in premium bids for subsidized 
coverage during state fiscal year 2011 
through its careful process of review and 
negotiation with carriers .109
Of course, state regulators need to strike 
a balance . If the requirements for gaining 
access to the exchange are unduly onerous, 
the exchange may have difficulty attracting 
an adequate number of participating 
health plans . 
The False Claims Act
PPACA Section 1313(a)(6)(A) applies the 
False Claims Act110 to health plans’ receipt 
of federal funds through the exchange . If 
a plan was not qualified to participate in 
the exchange but nevertheless did so, the 
insurer may be liable for three times the 
amount it collected in federal tax credits 
and subsidies for out-of-pocket costs, 
plus thousands of dollars in civil penalties 
for each wrongful federal payment . Such 
liability requires a showing that the insurer 
“knowingly submit[ted], or cause[d] 
another person or entity to submit, 
false claims for payment of government 
funds .” “Deliberate ignorance” or “reckless 
disregard” of the facts can also give rise to 
a claim .111 Put simply, liability may result if 
an insurance company participated in the 
exchange but knew or clearly should have 
known that it was not qualified to do so . 
For example, PPACA forbids qualified plans 
from “employ[ing] marketing practices 
or benefit designs that have the effect of 
discouraging the enrollment in such plan by 
individuals with significant health needs .”112 
If an insurer violated this requirement by 
developing a marketing plan or benefit 
structure that was intended to attract low-
cost rather than high-cost members, the 
insurer could be liable for three times the 
amount of federal subsidies the plan collected 
through the exchange, plus civil penalties .  
The False Claims Act Legal Center explains 
as follows this law’s special provisions 
that allow private parties to share in the 
government’s recovery when it is the 
private parties who brought false claims to 
the government’s attention:
“The False Claims Act contains qui 
tam, or whistleblower, provisions . Qui 
tam is a unique mechanism in the law 
that allows citizens with evidence of 
fraud against government contracts 
and programs to sue, on behalf of the 
government, in order to recover the 
stolen funds . In compensation for the 
risk and effort of filing a qui tam case, 
the citizen whistleblower or ‘relator’ 
may be awarded a portion of the funds 
recovered, typically between 15 and 
25 percent .  A qui tam suit initially 
remains under seal for at least 60 days 
during which the Department of Justice 
can investigate and decide whether to 
join the action .”113
In recent years, the False Claims Act 
has become one of the country’s most 
important tools for addressing Medicare 
and Medicaid fraud .114 In 2006, for example, 
the health care industry was responsible 
for more than 70 percent of total False 
Claims Act recoveries .115 PPACA’s explicit 
invocation of this Civil-War era statute 
thus has strong precedent when it comes to 
publicly-funded health coverage . 
27
At a minimum, state officials can educate 
the public and health plans about the 
False Claims Act . Such an effort can 
help deter insurers from violating legal 
requirements for participating in the 
exchange . In addition, a state agency, such 
as an insurance regulator, can bring False 
Claims Act violations to the attention of 
the U .S . Department of Justice, potentially 
qualifying for a qui tam award that could 
help defray future enforcement costs .116  
Such a state agency may be in an excellent 
position to spot health plan misbehavior 
that gives rise to a False Claims Act cause 
of action .   
Health consumer assistance programs
For federal fiscal year 2010, PPACA 
Section 1002 appropriates $30 million 
for the establishment and operation 
of independent health consumer 
assistance programs that help consumers 
file complaints and appeals, educate 
consumers about their rights and 
responsibilities, help consumers enroll in 
health plans and qualify for tax credits, 
and gather data documenting consumer 
complaints and problems . Programs must 
report these data to HHS, which shares 
them with other federal agencies and 
with state insurance regulators . After FY 
2010, funding is authorized but not yet 
appropriated .
Both to help consumers obtain coverage 
and care and to help policymakers learn 
about emerging problems, a state could 
prioritize the establishment of a consumer 
assistance program . If a state authorizes its 
consumer assistance program to pursue 
False Claims Act complaints, resulting 
qui tam recoveries could help provide 
future funding for consumer assistance, as 
explained above . 
In structuring these efforts, states could 
learn from some of the best practices of 
existing consumer assistance programs . 
For example, programs could partner with 
community-based legal services programs 
that already provide consumer assistance 
and represent beneficiaries in appeals . 
Likewise, states could authorize programs 
to bring systemic problems to the attention 
of administrators, state legislators, and the 
general public .117  
Additional administrative resources  
Like most state agencies, insurance 
departments are strapped for resources, 
particularly in states facing serious budget 
problems . It may not be realistic to expect 
most state officials to increase their 
enforcement activities without an increase 
in administrative funding .
Fortunately, several mechanisms 
are available to supplement current 
enforcement dollars, including the role 
potentially played by the exchange . A state 
could structure the exchange to work 
closely with its insurance regulator to 
assist in monitoring and oversight of plans 
participating in the exchange, lifting some 
burdens from the regulatory agency .
Depending on HHS interpretations of 
PPACA, an exchange might pay the state 
insurance regulator to certify plans as 
qualified, pursuant to an interagency 
agreement . As explained above, resources 
for the administrative activities of 
exchanges do not require state General 
Fund appropriations . Instead, they come 
from federal grants until 2015, after which 
they may be raised through user fees, such 
as charges to participating insurers .  
A second such mechanism involves federal 
grants to strengthen states’ capacity to 
monitor and analyze insurance premiums . 
PPACA Section 1003 appropriates $250 
million in funding from 2010 until 2014 
to help states review premium increases 
and to provide HHS with information and 
recommendations, laying the groundwork 
for later annual recommendations to 
the exchange about whether particular 
plans have increased premiums so rapidly 
that they should be excluded from the 
exchange . These resources could be helpful 
in meeting states’ new responsibility, under 
PPACA, to annually review unreasonable 
premium increases, along with HHS, 
as well as to help discharge any existing 
responsibilities pertaining to insurance 
rate review . 
Third, the above-described funding for 
health consumer assistance programs 
could help meet some existing 
responsibilities of state insurance 
regulators, depending on the extent to 
which such state agencies currently furnish 
similar assistance .  
Administrative appeals for consumers
Under Public Health Service Act Section 
2719, added by PPACA Section 10101, 
health plans must provide for internal 
appeals of purported adverse actions taken 
by health plans and, if such appeals are 
unsuccessful, external appeals decided by 
independent entities . 
These administrative appeal rights are 
important for several reasons . First, they 
can help consumers obtain necessary 
services . Second, effective appeals 
procedures make health plans less likely 
to arbitrarily deny covered services, 
since such action may lead to public 
embarrassment and consequent loss of 
market share . And third, appeals give 
regulators information about health 
insurers’ conduct . If a carrier reports a 
high appeal rate for a particular issue, that 
may signal a problem warranting further 
investigation .  
Introducing new public and private 
competitors into existing health 
insurance markets
One strategy for improving health 
insurers’ performance is to sponsor a 
new market entrant capable of winning 
market share away from plans that 
fail to meet consumers’ needs . Federal 
legislation provides substantial funding 
to help capitalize the initial development 
of consumer-owned, cooperative 
health plans, an effort that a state could 
encourage . 
 
But even with federal resources for the 
start-up phase, it is not easy for a new 
health insurer to gain a foothold in local 
markets . A new plan faces a catch-22: 
to recruit providers without paying 
exorbitant reimbursement rates, the plan 
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needs numerous enrollees; but to recruit 
enrollees, a plan needs a large provider 
network and the kind of low premiums 
that are impossible if providers are being 
paid exorbitant reimbursement rates . 
The Massachusetts exchange managed 
to recruit a new private insurer to serve 
Massachusetts residents—the first new 
entrant to the state’s insurance market in 
two decades .118 However, this new insurer 
has enrolled very few consumers to date, 
reaching only 1 percent of subsidized 
participants in the exchange .119
To escape this catch-22, existing state-
sponsored populations could form the 
nucleus of a new, publicly-administered 
health plan that competes with private 
insurers . Such an approach is being 
pursued in Connecticut, following 
that state’s enactment of health reform 
legislation in 2009 . Although the final 
details of implementation await further 
action in the state’s 2011 legislative session, 
following are some of the key features of 
the state’s approach:120
•		State employees and retirees, along with 
Medicaid and CHIP enrollees, will receive 
coverage through a new plan, dubbed 
“SustiNet .” Administered by a public entity, 
SustiNet will seek to slow health care 
cost growth while improving quality by 
implementing health care delivery system 
reforms that represent best practices, 
including interoperable health information 
technology (HIT), patient-centered 
medical homes (at a minimum for patients 
with chronic illness), and incentives for 
evidence-based care . 
•		Although all of the plan’s enrollees 
will share a common platform for 
implementing delivery system reforms, 
state employees and Medicaid beneficiaries 
will have different covered benefits, 
out-of-pocket cost-sharing rules, and 
provider payment rates . The purpose of 
this difference is to ensure that the shift 
to SustiNet will not reduce benefits or 
increase costs for any members . The latter 
objective also means that state employees 
and retirees will remain in a separate risk 
pool, so that the costs of new enrollees 
do not affect premiums charged for state 
workers .  
•		By July 2012, SustiNet will be offered for 
purchase by small firms, municipalities, 
and non-profits, consistent with the state’s 
small group market rules . To compete 
effectively for business, SustiNet can offer 
coverage with benefits and out-of-pocket 
cost-sharing typical of small group ESI, 
using brokers, agents, and other existing 
channels of sale . 
•	Once a major Medicaid expansion 
becomes effective, along with other 
subsidies and new mechanisms for highly 
expedited, automatic enrollment, insurers 
will be forbidden from discriminating 
in the individual market based on health 
status, and SustiNet will be available for 
purchase by individuals . 
In the wake of PPACA’s enactment, 
officials are considering qualifying 
SustiNet as a plan offered in the exchange 
starting in 2014 .121 This will require 
SustiNet to be a state-licensed plan . If 
Connecticut moves in this direction, it 
will need to decide whether to amend 
its existing insurance statutes to make it 
easier for a new, publicly-administered 
plan to become licensed . In addition, state 
policymakers may need to administer 
SustiNet through a quasi-governmental 
agency or independent state authority, 
to avoid a conflict of interest with state 
agencies that administer the exchange . 
Other states could take a similar approach . 
Using public employees and publicly 
subsidized consumers to establish critical 
mass not only surmounts the “catch-22” 
problem described above, it offers the 
potential to galvanize a change in a state’s 
health care delivery system, implementing 
many of the reforms described in the next 
section of this paper . With a substantial 
percentage of the state population enrolled 
in the publicly administered plan that 
implements delivery system reforms, it 
would become more economically feasible 
for physicians, hospitals, nurses, and 
other providers to change how they do 
business . Further, the state could work 
with private insurers to implement multi-
payor innovations that include but go 
beyond the public plan, such as reforms 
that implement HIT and patient-centered 
medical homes . If a public plan competing 
in the exchange implements reforms that 
slow cost growth, private insurers may 
need to adopt similar reforms to preserve 
market share . And if one large plan makes 
changes in how its members receive health 
care, other plans may find it easier to do 
the same . 
Put simply, not only could a state-
sponsored public plan give private insurers 
competition that many state markets 
currently lack, it could help bring about 
a transformation in the state’s overall 
health care delivery system that makes an 
important contribution to slowing cost 
growth while maintaining or improving 
quality and safety . Such a state policy would 
seek to pull together the diverse strands 
of delivery system reforms supported by 
PPACA into an integrated strategy for 
improving how health care is organized, 
reimbursed, and delivered, along the lines 
explored in the next section . 
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A Quick Recap
How states can use PPACA to hold insurers accountable to consumers 
•  Analyze PPACA’s new data sources to improve detection of insurance company violations. 
•  Consider supplementing PPACA’s data requirements if additional information would strengthen 
the state’s capacity to monitor insurer behavior.
•  Carefully structure and limit data requests, targeting only relevant information and using similar 
forms for all plans, thus simplifying the process of comparison and analysis.
•  Make insurer performance data publicly available and searchable, after careful redacting of 
information that could potentially identify individual consumers.
•  Consider using access to the exchange as an incentive for strong performance. 
•  Educate the public and insurers about the potential application of the False Claims Act to insurers 
that knowingly offering unqualified plans in the exchange. 
•  Authorize state agencies to bring False Claim Act claims, potentially using the resulting 
“whistleblower” awards to fund future enforcement efforts.
•  Prioritize implementation of federally-funded health consumer assistance programs, partnering 
with community-based legal services offices that already furnish similar services, and authorizing 
such programs to inform the public and policymakers about emerging problems. 
•  Leverage additional resources for state insurance departments by contracting with the exchange 
to certify plans as qualified, using federal grants to build capacity for rate review, and working with 
health consumer assistance programs.  
•  Ensure satisfactory implementation of consumer appeal procedures to help consumers obtain 
promised services, to give plans additional incentives to follow the law, and to flag the potential 
emergence of systemic problems. 
•  Introduce new competitors to the health insurance market by sponsoring a publicly-administered 
health plan that begins with a critical mass of enrollees consisting of Medicaid beneficiaries and 
public employees and retirees. Offered in the exchange to individuals and small firms, such a 
plan could implement best practices for reforming health care delivery to slow cost growth while 
improving or maintaining quality.
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One of the most widely shared complaints 
about the country’s health care system 
is the unsustainable, ongoing growth 
in spending . A remarkable variety of 
solutions have been proposed to slow cost 
increases while maintaining or improving 
quality . 
This variety found its way into federal 
health reform legislation . As Jonathan 
Gruber of M .I .T . observed, “It’s really hard 
to figure out how to bend the cost curve, 
but I can’t think of a thing to try that 
[the legislation] didn’t try… Everything 
is in here .”122 PPACA thus includes new 
methods for provider payment, new 
methods of organizing health care delivery, 
efforts to shift consumer behavior in 
healthier directions, increased provision of 
preventive health care services, initiatives 
to measure and improve quality, increased 
funding for comparative effectiveness 
research, and more . PPACA also follows 
on the heels of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which 
made major investments in HIT . 
Not only do PPACA’s strands embody many 
different substantive approaches, the policy 
tools employed are remarkably varied . 
National policy changes and demonstration 
projects with Medicaid and Medicare, 
demonstration projects that operate outside 
Medicare and Medicaid, grants to states, 
grants to other entities, rules for insurance 
companies, and new public health initiatives 
overseen by HHS all play a role . 
This gives state policymakers much 
to work with—perhaps too much . 
Selectivity and focus are likely to be 
especially important features of successful 
state PPACA implementation in this 
area . A careful analysis of the health 
care delivery system within the state 
and intensive consultation with local 
academic experts, employers, providers, 
insurers, and other stakeholders could be 
helpful . Such preliminary work can help 
identify the reform strategies that address 
important issues within the state and 
have the support needed for successful 
implementation .  
To help with that process, this section of 
the paper analyzes PPACA’s provisions and 
state policy options under several general 
headings:
•		Reimbursement reforms;
•		Delivery system reforms; and
•		Encouraging healthy behaviors, wellness, 
and prevention .
One preliminary comment is important . 
Outside the four corners of PPACA, ARRA’s 
investments in HIT may prove critically 
important for many PPACA efforts to change 
the country’s health care delivery system . A 
smoothly functioning information system, 
carefully tailored to help accomplish the goals 
of reimbursement or delivery system reform, 
can greatly facilitate the effectiveness of those 
efforts, whether they involve increased care 
coordination, management of patient care 
over time, or provider accountability .  
Reimbursement reforms
General approach
Current fee-for-service payment methods 
reward providers for volume and for high-
cost procedures, rather than for improving 
health outcomes or adding value by 
enhancing quality relative to cost . To fix 
this problem, a range of strategies have 
been suggested, including the following:
•		Using “bundled payments” when a patient 
is hospitalized, so that a single payment 
covers all costs (whether charged by 
physicians, hospitals, or others) both 
during hospitalization and for a limited 
period afterwards . Because a flat fee would 
cover post-discharge care, providers would 
lose money if patients are readmitted 
shortly after discharge . As a result, bundled 
payments would furnish an incentive 
to prevent costly re-hospitalization .123 
Bundled payments are also justified as 
encouraging providers to work together, 
reducing fragmentation and increasing 
care coordination, ultimately improving 
quality and reducing cost .124 
•		So-called “Accountable Care 
Organizations,” or ACOs, can allow teams 
of physicians (and potentially other 
providers, including hospitals) to share 
in the cost savings that result when these 
providers’ patients incur fewer health care 
costs than is typical for similar patients .125 
The analysis of cost savings takes into 
account all services, not just those 
furnished by the ACO . Among the goals 
of this effort are to encourage provider 
collaboration, reducing fragmentation, 
increasing care coordination, and 
ultimately improving quality while 
lowering cost . ACOs are among the care 
innovations that are strengthened when 
HIT is carefully structured to support 
reforms in health care delivery and 
reimbursement, as noted above . 
•		Hospital do not receive payment for 
so-called “never events”—that is, care 
so substandard that it should never take 
place .126 Payment can also be denied 
for treatment of infections or other 
preventable health problems that begin 
during a hospital stay . Along similar lines, 
reimbursement penalties can apply to 
hospitals with high rates of preventable 
readmissions soon after discharge .  
•		More broadly, “pay-for-performance” 
initiatives seek to increase or lower 
payment based on the achievement of 
identified metrics for providing safe, high-
quality, efficient care; and “global payment” 
strategies cover multiple services within a 
single payment, thus avoiding incentives to 
furnish excess care . 
Many aspects of PPACA embody this 
approach to reform . 
Reforming Health Care Delivery and Financing  
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PPACA Provisions
Medicare . By far PPACA’s most ambitious 
effort in this area involves Medicare:
• Hospitals
- Section 3001 establishes a hospital value-
based purchasing program, starting in FY 
2013 . Under this program, a percentage 
of hospital payment is tied to hospital 
performance on quality measures related 
to common and high-cost conditions, 
such as cardiac, surgical, and pneumonia 
care, but re-hospitalization rates are 
not included . Hospital performance is 
summarized into a single number . The 
highest ranking hospitals receive higher 
payments, which are funded by reducing 
payments to other hospitals .127 Hospital 
results are adjusted to take into account 
patient risk . 
- Section 3008 imposes financial penalties, 
starting in FY 2015, on hospitals that 
are in the top 25 percent nationally in 
their rate of infections or other health 
problems that the patient acquired while 
in the hospital .  Rates are adjusted to take 
into account patient risk . The identity of 
these hospitals is disclosed publicly .  
- Section 3025 lowers hospital payments 
based on the dollar value of each 
hospital’s percentage of potentially 
preventable Medicare readmissions, 
starting in FY 2012 . Readmission rates 
are adjusted to take into account patient 
risk . The section also creates a quality 
assistance program to help poor-
performing hospitals address problematic 
readmission rates . HHS is directed to 
publish information about hospital 
readmission rates for both Medicare and 
for all payers . 
• Physicians 
- Section 3007 creates a value-based 
modifier for physician payment . Doctors 
who furnish above-average care, defined 
based on quality and cost, receive extra 
Medicare reimbursement, which is 
funded by lowering Medicare payments 
for other doctors . This new modifier is 
phased in during calendar years 2015 and 
2016 . Results are modified to take into 
account patient risk as well as geographic 
factors that affect costs . 
- Section 3003 precedes the application 
of value-based modifiers with 
confidential feedback to physicians 
and physician groups about their 
performance, including (beginning in 
2012) information about their resource 
utilization compared to other physicians .  
- Section 3022 rewards ACOs that meet 
quality-of-care standards and reduce the 
costs of their patients’ care relative to a 
spending benchmark . Such ACOs receive 
a share of the savings they achieve for the 
Medicare program . Alternatively, HHS 
can use other methods, including partial 
capitation for highly integrated ACOs 
capable of bearing risk . HHS can give 
preference to ACOs that establish similar 
arrangements with private insurers . This 
new initiative begins in January 2012 and 
takes into account patient risk levels . 
•  Bundling. Section 3023 establishes a pilot 
program on payment bundling through 
which all hospitals, doctors, and post-acute 
care providers participating in an episode 
of care join together to receive a single 
payment for that episode, from 3 days 
before hospitalization through 30 days 
after discharge . The program begins on 
January 1, 2013, and can be expanded if it 
improves quality and reduces costs . 
•		Patient-centered incentives. Section 
10331(h) authorizes HHS to implement a 
demonstration project giving beneficiaries 
financial incentives to select physicians 
who furnish efficient, high-quality care .  
Such incentives may not increase costs 
above or reduce benefits below what 
Medicare would otherwise provide . Put 
differently, beneficiaries who select high-
value providers would either experience 
lower costs or receive additional benefits . 
Medicaid. PPACA includes both options 
and requirements for state Medicaid 
programs to move forward with 
reimbursement reforms:
• Demonstration projects
- Section 2704 directs HHS to establish 
Medicaid demonstration projects in up 
to eight states to test the application of 
bundled payment methodologies . This 
effort runs from calendar years 2012 
through 2016 . The demonstration will 
focus on health conditions that offer 
the possibility of improving care while 
slowing cost growth . 
- During fiscal years 2010 through 2012, 
Section 2705 of PPACA128 directs HHS 
to operate, in up to five states, Medicaid 
demonstration projects that pay large 
safety net hospitals or networks on a 
global or capitated basis, rather than fee-
for-service .129 
- Section 2706 lets states establish 
demonstration projects for pediatric 
ACOs from calendar year 2012 through 
2016, along the same general lines 
described above for Medicare . 
- Payment ban .  As of July 1, 2011, section 
2702 forbids federal Medicaid dollars 
from being used to pay for hospital 
treatment of infections or other health 
problems that a patient acquired while in 
the hospital . 
State policy options
Medicaid-specific approaches. State 
policymakers interested in pursuing this 
approach can implement the Medicaid 
demonstration provisions described above 
and vigorously implement the ban on 
using Medicaid dollars to pay for health-
care-acquired conditions . The latter ban 
applies, not just to Medicaid fee-for-
service payments, but also to managed 
care . State Medicaid programs accordingly 
could include in their contracts with 
Managed Care Organizations provisions 
requiring health plans to track health 
care-acquired conditions, to report such 
conditions to state and federal authorities, 
and to deny payment . 
Building on Medicare’s reimbursement 
innovations . As Medicare implements 
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reimbursement reforms, a state could apply 
those same reforms to public employee 
coverage, Medicaid, and commercial coverage 
in the exchange . Alternatively, rather than 
follow Medicare’s lead, some states in the 
vanguard on this issue may seek to include 
Medicare within state multi-payor efforts 
already under way . Such inclusion could be 
proposed to the Center on Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation, described previously 
on page 9 .  
Whether a state follows the federal lead or 
incorporates Medicare within state efforts, 
giving providers the same targets and 
incentives through multiple payors would 
drive behavior more powerfully than with 
a single program, even one as large as 
Medicare . Such coordination could also 
simplify providers’ lives since they would 
have one set of incentives rather than 
multiple incentive schemes to incorporate 
into their practice patterns . To further 
increase the number of covered lives 
affected by a single set of reimbursement 
reforms, a state could encourage self-
insured large employers and other private 
plans that operate outside the exchange to 
participate . In addition to strengthening 
and coordinating incentives for strong 
performance, an aggregated approach that 
bases incentive payments on all-payor 
performance would encourage hospitals 
and physicians to furnish high-quality, 
efficient care to all patients, regardless of 
their source of coverage .   
On the other hand, states considering 
movement towards Medicare-style “pay for 
performance” methods need to understand 
some of the challenges experienced to 
date with this approach . Some researchers 
question whether these payment methods 
have caused significant shifts in provider 
behavior; key design features, such as the 
measures used to assess performance and 
the nature of the incentive payment, can 
have a large impact on how reforms work 
out in practice; and some observers have 
expressed concerns about unanticipated 
consequences, including worsening 
racial and ethnic disparities, narrowing 
providers’ focus to the measures that 
are used to determine payment levels, 
and unfairly disadvantaging hospitals 
in low-income communities .130 State 
policymakers accordingly may wish to see 
how Medicare and other payment reforms 
work in practice before committing 
wholeheartedly to bring state residents 
more broadly within these efforts . Officials 
could also consider seeing phasing-in 
these initiatives gradually, perhaps starting 
with particular geographic areas rather 
than moving to immediate statewide 
implementation . 
As one would expect, multi-payer 
initiatives can be challenging to manage . 
Each payor has its own priorities and 
management structure . Further, enrollees 
may have different characteristic profiles 
in Medicaid, Medicare, and private plans . 
An intervention that fits one setting may 
not fit another . A careful focus on these 
issues may help states devise effective plans 
to overcome the challenges inherent in 
using the leverage of multiple payors to 
transform reimbursement methods and 
provider incentives . 
ACOs. PPACA’s preference for Medicare 
ACOs that establish similar relationships 
with private insurers gives states an 
important opening . Using its regulatory 
powers and its role as a selective purchaser 
in the exchange, a state could develop 
ACO-type arrangements with both 
public employee coverage and exchange-
based coverage . In addition, state 
officials could encourage private insurers 
operating outside the exchange and self-
insured group plans to develop similar 
arrangements, on a voluntary basis . A 
strong degree of state involvement may 
be necessary to prevent ACO-provider 
groups from developing leverage that lets 
them extract excessive payment levels from 
private insurers .131 But with that caveat, 
the ACO provisions of PPACA give states 
an opportunity to encourage the growth 
of integrated provider systems that take 
overall responsibility for the care of their 
patients on an ongoing basis, regardless 
of changes to the patients’ sources of 
coverage . 
Delivery system reforms
General approach
Many analysts describe most of American 
health care as fragmented and inconsistent, 
lacking the kinds of care coordination, 
evidentiary basis, and accountability 
that characterize high-performing 
health systems .132 To remedy this state 
of affairs, numerous interventions have 
been proposed . Some of the largest scale 
approaches include the following:
•		Interoperable HIT could allow the 
development of electronic health records 
(EHR) that a health care provider can 
access while seeing a patient . Health 
information exchange systems (HIE) 
would allow providers with diverse 
software to access and supplement 
a patient’s EHR housed elsewhere . 
Implemented to support other delivery 
system reforms, HIT could stop the 
provision of redundant services and 
furnish decision support that prevents 
medical errors, improves adherence 
to clinical care recommendations, and 
potentially reduces health care costs .133 
•	Patient-centered medical homes (PCMH) 
add to primary care a combination of 
patient education, care coordination 
(including management of transitions 
from hospital to home), 24-7 availability 
for patient consultation, and a clear locus 
of accountability and patient contact .134 
Some applications of the PCMH model 
have resulted in cost savings with 
chronically ill patients, particularly when 
coupled with a robust HIT system .135
•		Comparative effectiveness (CE) research 
could rigorously assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of possible treatments for 
particular health conditions . This would 
allow patients, providers, and health 
plans to make wiser choices between, for 
example, prescription drugs and surgery 
or between brand-name and generic drugs 
that seek to treat the same condition . While 
research alone is unlikely to change practice 
patterns,136 incorporating the results of CE 
research into health plan decisions about 
cost-sharing, covered services, and provider 
reimbursement methods could, according 
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to the Congressional Budget Office, slow 
cost growth without harming health 
outcomes .137
Other strategies include providing services 
at home, immediately following hospital 
discharge, to prevent rehospitalization 
among patients at high risk of returning 
to the hospital if care goes unmanaged;138 
using pharmacists to manage multiple 
medications received by a single patient;139 
shared decision-making through which 
patients and their caretakers assume an 
active role deciding between possible 
courses of treatment;140 and reforms that 
lessen the need to engage in defensive 
medicine to avoid malpractice liability .141 
To summarize, many of these strategies 
seek improved care coordination and 
proactive management of patient care 
throughout the full continuum of 
settings and conditions . While such 
reforms frequently improve quality of 
care, achieving cost savings may depend 
on focusing innovations on high-cost, 
chronically ill patients and coupling 
delivery system changes with targeted 
information support, through either 
electronic health records (perhaps 
supported by resources made available 
under ARRA) or disease registries .  
PPACA Provisions
PPACA approaches health care delivery 
system reform from many vantage 
points, in addition to the CMS Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, 
described on page 9 .
Patient-centered medical home. 
Provisions that promote patient-centered 
medical homes include the following:
•		Section 2703 creates a new Medicaid 
option to provide certain chronically ill 
beneficiaries with PCMH services . Such 
services can include comprehensive care 
management, care coordination and health 
promotion, comprehensive transitional 
care, patient and family support, referral 
to community and social support 
services, and use of HIT . The section 
authorizes waivers of the statewideness 
and comparability requirements that 
normally apply to Medicaid . Beginning 
in January 2011, HHS is directed to give 
states up to $25 million in planning grants . 
During the first eight quarters of a state’s 
implementation of this option, the federal 
government pays 90 percent of the cost 
of PCMH services . This new option is 
available to states beginning in January 
2011 . 
•		Section 3502 authorizes HHS grants to 
states to develop community health teams 
to support the PCMH model . Such teams 
support primary care physicians who, 
by themselves, may not be equipped to 
perform the full set of PCMH functions . 
•		Section 5405 authorizes $120 million in 
annual funding, during 2011 and 2012, to 
establish a system of educating primary 
care providers about new models of 
practice, including the patient-centered 
medical home . This section creates a 
“Primary Care Extension” program that 
will operate through state and regional 
hubs, with local “extension agents .”142  
Comparative effectiveness research . 
Sections 6301 and 10602 establish a 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
Institute to conduct comparative clinical 
effectiveness research . Such research can 
include information obtained through 
accessing electronic health records for 
Medicare, Medicaid, and other coverage 
systems to analyze the effectiveness 
of various services with particular 
populations . This research is supported 
by an ongoing funding stream with fees 
from private insurers and the Medicare 
program, which are projected to equal 
$1 .26 billion over 10 years . The findings 
announced by this Institute may not 
“include mandates for practice guidelines, 
coverage recommendations, payment, or 
policy recommendations .”143
The exchange . To be a “qualified plan” 
capable of being offered in the exchange, 
a plan must implement a “quality 
improvement strategy,” which includes144 a 
payment structure that encourages:
•		Improving health outcomes through 
quality reporting, effective case 
management, care coordination, chronic 
disease management, medication and care 
compliance initiatives, and the use of the 
medical home model;
•		Preventing hospital readmissions, 
whenever possible, through a 
comprehensive program for hospital 
discharge; 
•		Improving patient safety and reducing 
medical errors through best clinical 
practices, evidence-based medicine, and 
HIT; and
•		Wellness and health promotion  
(discussed below) . 
In addition, beginning in 2015, a qualified 
health plan is barred from contracting 
with a hospital that has more than 50 beds 
unless the hospital implements programs 
to promote patient safety and to prevent 
hospital readmissions soon after discharge . 
Medicare . Several Medicare provisions 
implement delivery system reforms:
•		Section 3026 appropriate $500 
million for a Community-Based Care 
Transitions Program through which 
hospitals and community-based entities 
furnish evidence-based care transition 
services, including active post-discharge 
engagement, to Medicare beneficiaries at 
high risk for hospital readmission . The 
program is funded during calendar years 
2011 through 2015, but the program 
may be extended and expanded if HHS 
determines that such steps would lessen 
Medicare spending without reducing 
quality of care . 
•		Section 3024 appropriates $30 million 
for FY 2010 through 2015 for an 
“Independence at Home” demonstration 
program for chronically ill Medicare 
beneficiaries . This program uses physician 
and nurse practitioners: (a) to provide—as 
part of a team that also includes physician 
assistants, pharmacists, and other health 
and social services staff—comprehensive, 
coordinated, continuous, and accessible 
care to high-need populations at home; 
and (b) to coordinate health care across 
all treatment settings . The demonstration 
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project is not intended to serve more than 
10,000 beneficiaries, nationwide . 
Additional specific reforms supported 
by PPACA include the following, each of 
which has funding authorized (but not yet 
appropriated):
•		Sec . 3503 provides grants for medication 
treatment management (MTM) programs 
operated by pharmacists who serve the 
chronically ill, beginning in May 2010 .  
•		Section 3506 establishes a program at 
HHS to facilitate shared decisionmaking, 
developing educational tools to help 
patients, caregivers, and authorized 
representatives understand their treatment 
options . This section authorizes grants to 
Shared Decisionmaking Resource Centers, 
which will provide technical assistance and 
training to physicians, who can also qualify 
for grants .  
•		Sec . 10607 funds state demonstration 
programs to evaluate alternatives to 
current medical tort litigation . 
State policy options
Creative state policymakers can use these 
tools to pursue a number of promising 
options . Following are some approaches 
that illustrate a much broader range of 
possible strategies .
Patient-centered medical homes 
could be implemented with a focus on 
high-cost, chronically ill consumers, 
accompanied by the meaningful use of 
HIT to support medical homes and related 
efforts to improve quality and efficiency . 
Such a focused implementation of care 
reorganization supported by information 
technology increases the likelihood of cost 
savings through reduced hospitalization 
as well as improvements in quality of care 
that have an impact on patient morbidity 
and mortality . A comprehensive effort 
aimed at implementing PCMH could 
include the following elements:
•		A state would implement the new 
Medicaid option for PCMH services, 
starting with a planning grant in 2011, and 
benefiting from eight quarters of enhanced 
federal matching funds .
•	The state would also implement PCMH 
services with public employees and retirees . 
It could encourage (or even require) 
private insurers to do likewise in areas of 
the state that have a particularly strong 
provider infrastructure capable of moving 
forward quickly with this model of care .
•	Once the exchange becomes operational 
in 2014, the state could require, as part 
of health plans’ quality improvement 
strategies, that insurers wishing to sell 
coverage in the exchange must fulfill 
PCMH functions . (Such an approach 
has the exchange function as a “selective 
contracting agent .”) 
•	The state would seek early funding 
from the CMS Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovations to support the 
PCMH model with community health 
teams, HIT implementation plans tailored 
to meet the needs of the PCMH model, 
and primary care extension centers (or 
other mechanisms to help providers 
transition to new models of practice) . Such 
funding would be needed if, as some fear, 
the authorized grants described above do 
not become appropriated .145 This funding 
could also support an intensive evaluation 
of effects on quality, clinical outcomes, 
cost, and patient and provider satisfaction . 
Given the need to slow health care cost 
growth by rapidly scaling up successful 
initiatives, such an evaluation could 
include early publication of interim results . 
Other delivery system innovations, 
such as a home-based program to 
prevent hospital readmissions of high-
risk patients, could likewise apply in 
Medicaid, to public employee coverage, 
and with health plans in the exchange . 
Such an effort could seek support from the 
CMS Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovations, along the lines explained 
earlier, in connection with the PCMH 
model .
Comparative effectiveness research could 
be applied to encourage the provision of 
less costly care that is no less effective than 
more expensive alternatives .  For example:
•		At some point in the future, HIT systems 
could incorporate decision support that 
informs physicians when they are about to 
order a service that is more costly than an 
alternative that, according to CE research, 
is equally effective . Physicians could 
proceed with the more costly service, but 
that choice would need to be conscious 
and explicit, with the rationale recorded 
in the electronic health record . Such 
choices would be taken into account by 
systems of provider feedback and quality 
improvement . 
•		Public employee coverage could 
incorporate the results of CE research 
by paying only for the least costly service 
that provides known medical benefits . To 
address consumer concerns, states may 
need to include two safeguards . The first 
is a method for reimbursing more costly 
services based on a physician’s showing 
that, given the particular patient, a more 
costly service is more likely to achieve its 
therapeutic goals or to avoid harmful side 
effects . Appeal rights would need to apply . 
And as a second safeguard, if the patient 
wants a more expensive service, he or she 
could obtain it by paying the extra cost . 
•		State law could authorize private health 
plans to implement policies in the 
commercial market like those described 
above for public employee coverage . 
•		Until this new policy has had several years 
in which to establish a track record, it 
would probably be unwise to apply it to 
subsidized coverage in the exchange, since 
low- and moderate-income consumers 
have less ability than others to pay for 
costly services out of pocket . This concern 
applies with even more force to Medicaid 
consumers . For these consumers, one of 
the two above-described safeguards would 
not exist .  
All-payer payment systems . This 
promising reform is on the list of practices 
specifically authorized for testing by 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation . Under an all-payer system, fees 
can vary by hospital, but a facility must 
charge the same amount for a particular 
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service whether the patient is uninsured or 
covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private 
insurance . For many years, Maryland 
has operated such an all-payer system, 
which has slowed hospital cost growth, 
stabilized the state’s hospital infrastructure 
by reducing the variability in hospital 
margins, and facilitated the provision of 
uncompensated care .146 PPACA now opens 
the door for other states to replicate this 
successful approach, which can potentially 
benefit public and private payors alike . 
Applying Medicare innovations to dual 
eligibles . A state could seek to apply to 
dual Medicare-Medicaid eligibles the 
above-described Medicare innovations 
involving Community-Based Care 
Transitions and the “Independence at 
Home” demonstration project . Dual 
eligibles are among the most costly 
and fragile of Medicare beneficiaries, 
so applying these innovations to this 
particular population could yield 
important gains, both financially and in 
terms of health status . A state pursuing this 
option would contribute its proportionate 
share of Medicaid resources, which 
would pay patient cost-sharing and cover 
Medicaid services outside the Medicare 
benefit package .  
Prevention and wellness
General approach
Several dimensions of prevention are 
the subject of reform efforts . The first, 
sometimes called “primary prevention,” 
involves population-based efforts to prevent 
the development of health problems . Such 
efforts may seek to eliminate environmental 
toxins, improve nutrition, increase exercise, 
reduce the use of tobacco and other 
addictive substances, alleviate stress, and 
otherwise encourage healthier behaviors . In 
particular, many observers now recommend 
vigorous efforts to address epidemic levels 
of obesity, which cause significant health 
care spending .147 
A second dimension, often termed 
“secondary prevention,” involves providing 
screenings and tests to spot potential 
health problems . The goal of such tests 
is to allow prompt diagnosis and early 
treatment that prevents the development 
of serious illness .148  
PPACA Provisions
PPACA’s approach to prevention has many 
dimensions . 
HHS’ fully funded health promotion 
initiatives outside Medicaid include the 
following provisions:
•		Section 4001 establishes a National 
Prevention, Health Promotion and Public 
Health Council to develop a national 
strategy for prevention and health 
promotion .
•		Section 4002 creates a Prevention 
and Public Health Investment Fund 
(Prevention Fund) to support initiatives 
to implement the national strategy for 
prevention and health promotion . PPACA 
appropriates ongoing resources to the 
fund, starting at $500 million in FY 2010 
and gradually rising to $2 billion a year 
in 2015 and later years . HHS has broad 
discretion in the use of these funds .149 
•		Section 4201 creates a program of 
Community Transformation Grants, 
which can be supported through the 
Prevention Fund . These grants, which can 
go to state or local government as well as 
community-based organizations, support 
policy, environmental, programmatic, and 
infrastructure changes needed to promote 
healthy living and reduce racial and ethnic 
disparities . Among the potential uses of 
these grants are community-wide plans 
to reduce tobacco use, mental illness, or 
obesity . For example, such a grant could be 
used to build paths and restructure streets 
to make neighborhoods more walkable; 
to fund tax incentives and other initiatives 
to bring affordable, healthy food to low-
income communities; to create afterschool 
programs that permit children and youth 
to exercise safely; etc .  
•	Section 4004 allocates up to $500 million 
for a national public education and 
outreach campaign aimed at promoting 
healthy behaviors and encouraging 
the use of available screenings and 
other preventive care services . This 
campaign includes development of a 
website allowing individuals to create 
personalized wellness plans . 
•		Section 2953 appropriates $75 million 
a year, during fiscal years 2010 through 
2014, for “Personal Responsibility 
Education .” These grants to states (or 
to local or community-based groups, 
if a state chooses not to apply) fund 
evidence-supported methods to teach 
adolescents about both abstinence and 
contraception, with the goal of lowering 
teen pregnancy rates . The grants are also 
used to teach adolescents about subjects 
that prepare them for adulthood, such 
as healthy relationships, parent-child 
communication, adolescent development, 
financial literacy, etc . 
•	New Public Health Service Act Section 
2705, added by PPACA Sec . 1201, requires 
HHS, by July 2014, to establish a 10-state 
demonstration project testing wellness 
initiatives in the individual insurance 
market . Such initiatives can cut premiums 
by up to 30 percent when members 
participate in certain health promotion 
and disease prevention programs . 
Medicaid health promotion provisions 
include the following:
•	Section 4108 appropriates $100 million, 
for use beginning in January 2011, by 
states in giving Medicaid beneficiaries 
incentives to participate in programs that 
have demonstrated success in helping 
low-income people make improvements 
in their weight, cholesterol, blood 
pressure, smoking, diabetes, and (at 
state option) associated co-morbidities, 
such as depression . If a state chooses to 
participate in this effort, ordinary Medicaid 
statewideness requirements are waived as 
needed . 
•	Section 4107 requires Medicaid to cover 
tobacco cessation services for pregnant 
women, beginning on October 1, 2010 . 
•	Section 4004’s above-described 
public education campaign includes a 
requirement that states must educate 
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beneficiaries about preventive and 
obesity-related services that are available 
to Medicaid enrollees, including obesity 
screening and counseling for children 
and adults .
Health promotion initiatives that are 
authorized without appropriations 
include the following:
•	Section 4202 authorizes grants to states 
and localities to conduct pilot programs 
reducing chronic illness among 55-to-64 
year olds .   
•	Section 4206 authorizes a demonstration 
project to furnish clients of community 
health centers with comprehensive risk-
factor assessments and individualized 
wellness plans .
•	Section 10408 authorizes $200 million 
in grants, from FY 2011 through 2014, 
to provide employees of small businesses 
with access to comprehensive workplace 
wellness programs . To qualify, a firm must 
have fewer than 100 full-time employees . 
Initiatives focused on preventive health 
care services include the following:
•	Under Sections 2713, 4104 and 4105, 
preventive services, without cost-sharing, 
are required of new health plans and 
guaranteed to Medicare beneficiaries . 
•	Section 4204 authorizes states to purchase 
adult vaccines at reduced rates under 
contracts between manufacturers and 
the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention . 
•	Section 4106 gives Medicaid programs 
the option, beginning in January 2013, 
to provide adults with (a) any clinical 
preventive service receiving an A or B 
grade from the U .S . Preventive Services 
Task Force and (b) immunizations 
recommended by the Advisory Committee 
on Immunization Practices . States that 
cover such services without copayments 
receive an extra percentage point in the 
federal matching rate for this care .
State policy options
Primary prevention . State policymakers 
interested in promoting healthy behaviors 
and wellness could seek federal grants and 
try to participate in the demonstration 
projects described above, including 
Community Transformation Grants; 
Medicaid grants to address obesity; 
smoking, and other risk factors; and any 
additional authorized grants that receive 
funding . States will also need to ensure 
that their Medicaid programs comply 
with federal Medicaid requirements for 
pregnant women’s tobacco cessation 
services and public education about 
obesity screening and counseling . 
Several of these initiatives may be 
controversial in particular states, including 
teen pregnancy prevention grants and 
demonstration projects involving wellness 
programs and premium discounts in the 
individual market . Some observers worry 
that the latter policies could discriminate 
against consumers with health problems 
and that employees may have differing 
access to and levels of participation 
in wellness programs based on their 
education, income level, and race or 
ethnicity .150 
More generally, state policymakers need to 
understand that, while primary prevention 
yields many important benefits, not all 
such efforts save money . Positive results, 
both in terms of cost and health status, 
may be most likely if policymakers do 
two things: focus their efforts on the 
highest-risk populations and communities, 
among whom low-income people are 
disproportionately represented; and track 
the evolving science documenting the 
strategies that have the greatest impact, 
modifying interventions as necessary .  
Secondary prevention . State public 
health officials could take advantage 
of discounted costs to purchase adult 
vaccines, including vaccines aimed at the 
flu and the human papillomavirus . State 
Medicaid programs could also consider 
covering, free of cost-sharing, preventive 
services that qualify for a small increase in 
the applicable federal matching percentage . 
While tests and screens for illnesses like 
cancer and high blood pressure may 
or may not save money, recommended 
screenings can improve health status by 
allowing the more rapid detection of 
illness and commencement of care .  
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A Quick Recap
How states can use PPACA to slow health care cost growth while improving 
quality
•  Implement Medicaid demonstration projects that test reimbursement reforms.
•  Consider applying the same reimbursement reforms to Medicare, Medicaid, public employee coverage, 
insurance sold in the exchange, state-licensed private insurance, and (on a voluntary basis) self-insured 
group plans. A multi-payor initiative can include Medicare either by applying Medicare reimbursement 
reforms to other payors or by applying state payment innovations to Medicare. The latter approach can be 
proposed as a demonstration project to the CMS Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation. 
•  Consider incorporating Accountable Care Organizations into private coverage, including public employee 
insurance, health plans offered in the exchange, and other private insurers. This approach may require 
active intervention to prevent ACOs from acquiring so much leverage with insurers that they can raise 
charges to unsustainable levels. 
•  Implement patient-centered medical homes (PCMH), supported by HIT investment, with an intensive focus 
on high-cost, chronically ill patients. A state could adopt the new Medicaid option for PCMH coverage, 
include PCMHs in public employee insurance, require plans in the exchange to cover PCMH functions, 
and encourage other private plans to do likewise. A state could seek funding from the CMS Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovations for (a) community health teams that help one- and two-physician 
offices serve as a medical home and (b) evaluation, including rapid reporting of interim results.
•  Implement other promising delivery system reforms. As with PCMH, such reforms can be included in 
Medicaid, public employee coverage, insurance offered in the exchange, and other private plans. One 
promising example is home-based monitoring and coaching for high-risk patients after hospital discharge, 
to prevent costly rehospitalization.
•  Apply the results of comparative effectiveness research by furnishing HIT decision support that (a) tracks 
physicians’ choices of high-cost care that furnishes no known clinical benefit and (b) asks physicians to 
justify those choices. States could also change public employee coverage to pay for the lowest-cost care 
that provides maximum clinical value, requiring consumers to pay the extra cost if they want alternative 
services that yield no additional clinical benefit. State statutes could permit private insurers to implement 
similar policies.  
•  Consider shifting hospital reimbursement to an all-payer system where a hospital’s charges do not vary 
according to the patient’s source of coverage.  
•  Apply promising Medicare innovations to dual eligibles. With duals as a target population, states could join 
Medicare demonstrations of delivery system reforms. These include community-based efforts to prevent 
rehospitalization of recently discharged patients; and home-based services for high-cost beneficiaries. 
•  Participate in federal grant programs and demonstration projects that promote healthy behaviors and 
wellness, including Community Transformation Grants and Medicaid grants to incentivize participation in 
programs that address obesity and smoking. 
•  Take advantage of new discounts for purchasing adult vaccines.
•  For Medicaid adults, consider covering preventive services without co-pays.
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Many state officials have expressed 
concerns about the burdens PPACA will 
impose on state budgets . Receiving much 
less public attention is the potential 
PPACA offers to reduce state general 
funding spending on health care and 
health coverage . Such reductions can result 
from savings on health coverage for public 
employees and retirees; substituting federal 
Medicaid dollars for current state or local 
spending; moving Medicaid beneficiaries 
into coverage with subsidies that are 
funded entirely by the federal government; 
and slowing health care cost growth within 
Medicaid . In addition, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) anticipates that ESI 
enrollment will drop by 2 percent .151 Based 
on labor economics research, employers 
will pass on much of their resulting savings 
in the form of higher wages, which will 
increase state revenue .  
The amount that specific strategies will save 
varies considerably by state . Accordingly, 
the goal of this section of the report is 
simply to flag potentially useful approaches 
for further, state-specific analysis . 
Savings on health coverage for public 
employees and retirees
States can achieve savings through several 
approaches . First, PPACA provides $5 
billion in federally-funded reinsurance 
to cover claims incurred by early retirees, 
provided that the employer furnishing 
coverage implements measures to reduce 
spending on the chronically ill . The statute 
specifically authorizes state and local 
government to claim these funds .
Second, integrating several strategies to 
help the chronically ill offers the potential 
to slow cost growth, as noted above . The 
combination of medical home services, 
HIT, and interventions to prevent 
rehospitalization can potentially achieve 
net savings, provided that these efforts are 
carefully focused on high-cost employees 
and retirees . 
Third, state officials can help local 
governments benefit from these strategies 
to limit health care costs . In addition, 
many localities may be small enough to 
offer their employees and retirees coverage 
in the exchange, which could result in 
modest administrative savings . (As noted 
above, even large employers can begin 
participating in the exchange in 2017, at 
state option .) Cutting local health care 
costs can benefit a state financially by 
lessening the need for local aid . 
Substituting federal Medicaid dollars 
for state and local dollars
Under current law, much state and local 
spending provides physical or mental 
health care to adults with incomes at or 
below 138 percent FPL . Such residents will 
qualify for Medicaid under PPACA . Even 
undocumented immigrants will qualify for 
Medicaid coverage of emergency services, 
so long as their incomes fall below the 
threshold and they meet state residency 
requirements (which can be shown, e .g ., by 
presence in the state with intent to remain 
indefinitely) .152 
This means that significant state and 
local spending in these areas can now be 
replaced by federal Medicaid funds . In the 
most straightforward example, programs 
to compensate hospitals for serving the 
uninsured can now be replaced, in whole 
or in part, by Medicaid, including federal 
matching funds . Medicaid can likewise 
substitute for health coverage programs 
serving childless adults at the state or local 
level, often provided in connection with 
General Assistance or General Relief cash 
assistance . 
More broadly, states can examine their 
health and human services spending on 
behalf of low-income adults to see which 
services might qualify for federal Medicaid 
funds . For example, counseling provided 
to parents to prevent or stop child abuse 
may qualify for Medicaid reimbursement, 
potentially along with other social services . 
State mental health services are another 
candidate for federal Medicaid funding, 
with the exception of health services 
provided to adults age 21 to 64 who are 
patients of an institution for mental 
disease (IMD), which is defined as an 
“institution of more than 16 beds, that is 
primarily engaged in providing diagnosis, 
treatment, or care of persons with mental 
diseases .”153 Even IMD services might 
qualify for federal matching funds in 
a state that participates in a PPACA-
authorized demonstration of Medicaid 
coverage for IMD services that stabilize an 
emergency psychiatric condition .154
When these state programs serve childless 
adults who previously were ineligible for 
federal Medicaid dollars, this substitution 
of federal for state dollars can begin 
without delay . That is because coverage 
of childless adults is now permitted 
through State Plan Amendment, with 
states receiving their normal Medicaid 
match . For example, Connecticut has 
already received approval for a State 
Plan Amendment to provide federally-
matched Medicaid to childless adults who 
previously would have qualified for the 
state-funded General Assistance Medical 
Care program .155 
However, these strategies will become 
particularly promising beginning in 2014 . 
At that point, adults who would have been 
ineligible for Medicaid under 2009 rules—
that is, the “newly eligible”—will qualify 
for an unusually high federal matching 
percentage, starting at 100 percent in 
2014-2016, as explained previously . A state 
does not reduce its access to such highly 
enhanced match if, like Connecticut, 
it implements an interim expansion of 
Medicaid for childless adults . 
 
Reducing State Budget Deficits
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Moving Medicaid beneficiaries into 
subsidized coverage that is fully 
federally funded
Most states have some adults who receive 
Medicaid even though their income 
exceeds 138 percent FPL (calculated 
based on MAGI) . Eligibility for pregnant 
women typically exceeds that threshold, 
in some states by considerable margins . 
The medically needy can also qualify 
with incomes above 138 percent FPL by 
incurring, within a state-defined period 
between one and six months in length, 
medical bills that reduce their disposable 
income below medically needy income 
levels . (The required level of health care 
costs before a consumer qualifies as 
medically needy is sometimes termed a 
“share of cost” or “spend-down amount .”) 
In a few states, parents currently qualify 
with incomes above 138 percent FPL . 
Without Medicaid, these adults would receive 
either subsidized coverage in the exchange or 
Basic Health Program (BHP) coverage in a 
state electing that option (described above) . 
In either case, the federal government would 
pay all subsidy costs, lifting from states the 
burden of paying for Medicaid . 
PPACA’s maintenance of effort 
requirements for adults end once 
exchanges come on line in 2014 . At that 
point, a state could, at least in theory, 
terminate Medicaid for some or all adults 
with incomes above 138 percent FPL, 
shifting them into federally-subsidized 
exchange coverage and reducing state 
General Fund costs .
This general strategy needs to be 
pursued carefully . Mishandled, it could 
create serious access problems for some 
beneficiaries, including pregnant women 
and long-term care recipients . To avoid 
such problems, a state could consider the 
following approaches:
•		To eliminate Medicaid coverage for 
pregnant women above 138 percent FPL 
without reducing access to care, a state 
could implement two policies . 
- As explained previously on page 13, a 
state could use the BHP option to provide 
Medicaid-level benefits and cost-sharing 
to pregnant women along with other 
adults up to 200 percent FPL, with the 
federal government paying all costs .
- For pregnant women at higher income 
levels who would have qualified for 
Medicaid under prior law, the state could 
supplement subsidies in the exchange to 
eliminate out-of-pocket cost-sharing for 
pregnancy-related services . State costs for 
such supplements would be significantly 
less than what the state would have spent 
under current law for Medicaid-eligible 
pregnant women .
•	A state might be able to greatly reduce 
its spending on medically needy 
beneficiaries above 138 percent FPL 
while improving their access to care . 
HHS and the U .S . Department of the 
Treasury may conclude that tax credit 
eligibility can extend to medically needy 
adults as long as they have not yet 
fulfilled their spend-down requirements 
and become fully eligible for Medicaid . If 
so, states can encourage their medically 
needy beneficiaries to apply for the BHP 
or tax credits in the exchange . By shifting 
their coverage, many such beneficiaries 
would improve their access to care, 
since they would receive ongoing health 
insurance rather than episodic coverage 
that becomes available during each 
spend-down period only after they have 
incurred the required amount of health 
care costs . And beneficiaries could still 
qualify for Medicaid coverage of long-
term care by paying for nursing home 
services or home-based care not covered 
by BHP or health plans in the exchange . 
But because insurance in BHP or the 
exchange will delay the start of these 
beneficiaries’ spend-down, state long-
term care costs will decline .  
Fortunately, states do not need to decide 
these complex issues in the next year or two . 
Federal authorities have time to provide 
guidance that will help state Medicaid 
programs reduce their spending on adults 
above 138 percent FPL without harming 
vulnerable residents’ access to care . 
 
Slowing health care cost growth 
within Medicaid
As noted above, PPACA’s delivery system 
reforms can be applied to Medicaid; and 
potential cost savings may result if the 
medical home model’s care management 
innovations are coupled with HIT 
investments and focused tightly on high-
cost, chronically ill beneficiaries .  Along 
similar lines, PPACA’s opportunities to 
encourage healthy behaviors could prove 
useful in slowing Medicaid cost growth . 
But the most promising strategy to slow 
Medicaid cost growth may involve PPACA’s 
new options to integrate Medicaid and 
Medicare dollars and services in covering 
dual eligibles (people who qualify for 
both Medicare and full Medicaid) . These 
seniors and people with disabilities are 
some of the country’s frailest, highest-
cost consumers . Currently, a single dual 
eligible may be covered by three different 
systems—Medicare Parts A and B for most 
physician and hospital care, a Medicare Part 
D prescription drug plan, and Medicaid 
for long-term care, Medicare cost-sharing, 
and Medicaid services outside the Medicare 
benefits package . Each of these coverage 
systems has an incentive to shift costs 
to the others . Under these programs as 
traditionally run, care is rarely coordinated 
among these funding streams, creating 
dangers of redundant or even dangerously 
inconsistent care . And some providers have 
an incentive to maximize their revenues by 
“gaming” these various coverage systems, 
even if those strategies increase total 
taxpayer-funded costs .156  
To address this situation, PPACA, for the 
first time, allows the complete integration 
of both dollars and care for dual eligibles . 
Section 2081 creates a new Coordinated 
Health Care Office within CMS to 
encourage the integration of Medicare 
and Medicaid for dual eligibles . In some 
ways more important, one of the models 
that PPACA approves for testing by the 
CMS Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation involves “[a]llowing States 
to test and evaluate fully integrating care 
for dual eligible individuals in the State, 
including the management and oversight 
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of all funds under the applicable titles 
with respect to such individuals .”157 The 
precise parameters of this model are not 
defined, leaving room for states to propose 
creative initiatives that incorporate social 
services, intensive care coordination, 
nimble management of service provision 
in response to individual consumer need 
and the evolving scientific literature, and 
the use of home- and community-based 
alternatives to nursing home care . 
Given the fragile condition of many dual 
eligibles, implementing such a major 
change needs to proceed slowly and 
carefully . State policymakers could thus 
consider pilot-testing this reform in part 
of the state, gradually expanding it to other 
state residents if careful evaluation of early 
experience shows positive results for both 
taxpayers and beneficiaries .
Another approach would use insurers 
rather than state officials to coordinate 
care in fully integrated system of coverage 
for dual eligibles . Medicare Advantage, 
the private health insurance option for 
Medicare, allows Special Needs Plans, or 
SNPs, to specialize in meeting the needs 
of particular populations . SNPs that 
focus on dual eligibles must coordinate 
services with Medicaid, but they are not 
required to include both Medicaid and 
Medicare dollars within a single, integrated 
system that covers the full continuum of 
care . PPACA gives an incentive for such 
integration by providing higher capitated 
payment levels when SNPs combine 
all Medicare and Medicaid dollars and 
take full responsibility for furnishing all 
covered services .
Using the SNP model, a state could, in 
effect, pay a health plan to develop and 
operate an integrated system of coverage 
and care for dual eligibles . This would 
allow the state to guarantee a level of 
savings by, for example, making a 5 
percent reduction (relative to projected 
levels under the status quo) in Medicaid’s 
contribution to the SNP capitated 
payment .158 
Such an approach would carry risks . 
Private plans may have an incentive to 
provide too little care . Intensive quality 
measurement, using electronic health 
records and other methods, would be 
essential to detect and address emerging 
problems, along with the proactive 
involvement of independent patient 
advocates . 
A second danger is that a small number 
of high-cost outliers could significantly 
affect total costs . To address this concern, 
it may be important for plans to purchase 
reinsurance and to have a large number 
of enrollees in each SNP . On the other 
hand, such a large enrollment level 
involves a trade-off of making it difficult 
or impossible to slowly phase in this new 
approach, starting with a small, local area . 
In the past, states have tried to integrate 
dual eligibles’ care, but such integration 
was severely constrained by federal law . 
As a result of PPACA, states now have 
significant new opportunities to test 
strategies that offer the hope of controlling 
costs with dual eligibles while maintaining 
or improving their access to high-quality 
care . Whether public agencies or private 
insurers administer systems of care that 
fully integrate all Medicare and Medicaid 
dollars and services, careful and deliberate 
implementation will be essential to both 
safeguard beneficiary health and assure 
the long-term sustainability of these new 
systems . 
Revenue effects of reduced ESI
One final point about revenue is 
important to make in the context of state 
budget deficits . If CBO projections prove 
accurate, PPACA will result in a net 2 
percent reduction in employer-sponsored 
insurance (ESI), as coverage becomes 
slightly less common among small firms 
and companies with mostly low-wage 
workers who qualify for subsidies in the 
exchange .159 Labor economists teach that 
employers will share much of the resulting 
cost savings with workers in the form of 
higher wages .160 If this takes place, states 
can expect increased revenue from income 
taxes and (to a lesser extent) sales taxes . 
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A Quick Recap
How states can use PPACA to reduce state budget deficits
•  For public employee coverage, claim federal reinsurance funds for early retirees.
•  Apply PPACA’s strategies for slowing cost growth through delivery system and reimbursement 
reforms to public employee coverage.  High-cost enrollees and their employers can benefit from 
integrated reforms that include strong HIT support for proactive care management systems like 
patient-centered medical homes.
•  Help localities save money on health coverage through those same approaches as well as 
through providing access to group coverage in the exchange. Local savings may reduce the need 
for state-funded local aid.
•  Shift state- and locally-funded services into federally-funded Medicaid. This includes mental 
health and social services for low-income adults, payments to hospitals for uncompensated care, 
and “General Assistance” health care programs for childless adults. 
•  Consider shifting Medicaid adults with incomes above 138 percent FPL into the exchange or 
the Basic Health Program, both of which have subsidies that are funded entirely by the federal 
government. 
•  Slow cost growth within Medicaid by applying, to high-cost beneficiaries, PPACA’s strategies for 
delivery system and reimbursement reforms, described above.
•  Achieve savings while improving patient care for dual eligibles by combining Medicare and 
Medicaid dollars and services into either a state-administered care management program or 
a private health plan receiving a single capitated payment covering all care. To avoid problems 
in serving this very fragile population, it may be important to begin with local pilot projects and 
gradually scale up.  
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Conclusion
As this report goes to press, public 
discussion of health reform remains hotly 
contested . Some defend the new federal 
legislation with fierce ardor, while others 
advocate its rapid repeal . 
Whether state officials oppose the new 
federal law, support it, or remain neutral, 
they now face the daunting task of rolling 
up their sleeves and implementing the 
legislation as effectively as possible to 
benefit the people of their state . 
This report’s goal is to help state officials 
understand options for implementing 
PPACA to achieve important state policy 
goals . For decades, state officials have 
sought to improve access to coverage 
and care, slow cost growth, and improve 
quality . The new federal law provides 
powerful new tools for making progress 
towards these longstanding state goals .  
Without doubt, the challenges of 
implementation are immense . But the 
policy rewards could be even more 
significant . As they have so many times 
in the past, officials in states across the 
country will surely take full advantage 
of this new federal legislation, exercising 
creativity and diligence to secure major 
gains for their states’ residents .  
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